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YOUNGER AND ITS PROGENY:
A VARIATION ON THE THEME OF
EQUITY, COMITY AND FEDERALISM
Robert Allen Sedler*
So much has been written on the theme of Younger' and its progeny,
that my original intention to "update" my earlier work in this area 3 has
given me some misgivings. Butjust as at an earlier time I tended to put less
emphasis on the "federalism" significance of Dombrowski4 and Younger,
in favor of a "remedial-political" analysis 5 I am persuaded that the
Supreme Court's institutional behavior6 in the years since Younger was
decided, notwithstanding the doctrinal qnd policy articulation of federal-
ism considerations, cannot be separated from the remedies context in
which these questions necessarily arise, and in fact has been controlled by
it. My conclusion, looking to the results of the Court's decisions, and to the
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University. Valuable assistance in the preparation of
this article was provided by Ms. Laurie Elias, a second-year student at Wayne State University
Law School.
1, Younger v. Harris. 401 U.S. 37(1971).
2. Some of the more recent works dealing with Younger and its progeny are: Bartels.
A voiding a Comed of Errors: A Model.for Adjudicating Federal Civil Rights Suits That
"Interfere" with State Civil Proceedings, 29 STAN. L. REV. 27 (1976): Fiss. Dombrowski, 86
YALE L.J. 1103 (1977): Redish. The Doctrine ofYounger v. Harris: Deference in Search ofa
Rationale, 63 CORN. L. REV. 463 (1978): Soifer & Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: Recon-
structuring Reconstruction. 55 TEX. L. REV. 1141 (1977): see also Zeigler, An Accommoda-
tion of the Younger Doctrine and the Duty of the Federal Courts to Enforce Constitutional
Safeguards in the State Crininal Law Process, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 266(1976). A comprehen-
sive historical analysis of the Younger problem" is found in Wechsler, Federal Courts. State
Criminal Law and the First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 740 (1974).
3. Sedler. Dombrowski in the Wake of Younger: The View from Without and Within.
1972 Wisc. L. REV. I [hereinafter cited as Sedler, Wake]: Sedler. The Dombrowski-Type Suit
as an E;fjective Weapon for Social Change: Reflections fron Without and Within. 18 KAN. L.
REV. 237,629 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Sedler. Reflections].
4. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
5. See Sedler, Reflections. supra note 3. at 255-58: Sedler. Wake. supra note 3, at 5-8, 57-
61.
6. By "institutional behavior" I am referring to the pattern of results that is reached by
the Court in the cases coming before it for decision. The Court's institutional behavior
evolves over a period of time, and is not necessarily fully consistent with the doctrine
articulated by the Court to explain the basis of its decisions. It is my submission that the
"law" of the Constitution is a reflection of the interaction between the Court's institusional
behavior and its articulated doctrine.
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response of the lower federal courts to those decisions.7 is that despite the
articulation of federalism considerations, the Court has, with one possible
exception,8 applied traditional remedies principles to determine the scope
of federal judicial interference with the exercise of state governmental
power. The thrust of this article will be directed toward explaining this
variation on the theme of "equity, comity and federalism." 9  I will
conclude, however, by discussing the federalism considerations that I
believe in our constitutional scheme should govern the nature and scope of
federal judicial interference with the exercise of state governmental power.
1. EQUITY, COMITY AND FEDERALISM:
THE STRUCTURAL PROBLEM
Younger and its progeny involve federal judicial interference with state
governmental power in two different, though perhaps related ways, and
thus pose, analytically at least, two different questions. One concerns
federal judicial interference in pending statejudicial proceedings, while the
other concerns federal judicial interference with state governmental action
when no state judicial proceeding is pending. Both questions, however,
seemingly have been approached by the Court under the rubric of "Our
Federalism." That phrase, as defined by Justice Black in Younger,
incorporates the concept of comit i: "a proper respect for state functions, a
recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of
separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the
National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are
left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.
7. It is in the lower federal courts where the constitutional battles are waged on a day-to-
day basis and where the impact of the Supreme Court's decisions is most cogently felt. For
example, while the Supreme Court in Younger said that in Dombrowskiit had not authorized
federal judicial interference in pending state court criminal proceedings solely on the ground
that the law under which the prosecution was brought was allegedly "void on its face," 401
U.S. at 47-5 1. this was precisely how the lower federal courts had read Dombrowski, and their
institutional behavior reflected this reading. See the discussion and review of cases in
Wechsler, supra note 2. at 861-66. The "law" of Dombrowski. therefore, was that federal
courts could enjoin pending state court criminal proceedings when the law under which the
prosecution was brought was found to be "void on its face" in violation of the First
Amendment.
8. See the discussion of the applicability of Younger to pending state court non-criminal
proceedings. notes 141-98 intfra and accompanying text.
9. The phrase, "equity, comity and federalism," appears first in Steffel v. Thompson, 415
U.S. 452,460(1974).
10, 401 U.S. at 44.
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Whenever federal and state interests are involved, said Justice Black,
"Our Federalism" requires a balancing. and it represents a "system in which
there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National
Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it
may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always
endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate
activities of the states."' In terms of the doctrinal and policy articulation
of Younger and its progeny, it would appear that the Court has balanced
federal and state interests in deciding the appropriate scope of federal
judicial interference with the exercise of state governmental power.12
In these cases, however, since the question is one of federal judicial
interference with state governmental action. 3 there is a remedies compo-
nent and a iusticiahilitv component as well. The remedies-justiciability
component is applicable to federal judicial interference with all govern-
mental action, and applies equally when the aid of the federal courts is
invoked to challenge the validity of federal governmental action.14 From a
remedies standpoint, whether the case is in a federal court or in a state
court, a party seeking injunctive relief against governmental action must
show "irreparable injury."' 1 and a party seeking declaratory relief must
show the existence of an "actual controversy" 1 6 between that party and the
governmental official against whom relief is sought. Insofar as the federal
courts are concerned, these remedies requirements blend with thejusticia-
II. /d. In a "powers" context, the balancing between federal and state interests.
weighted on the side of the state, appears in recent cases such as Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976), and National League of Cities v. Usery. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). where
considerations otherwise applicable to determine the scope of federal and state power under
the interstate commerce clause were subordinated to the consideration of"state sovereignty."
12. Most of the commentators accept the "federalism" explanation of Younger and its
progeny, and they maintain that the Court has improperly struck the balance in favor of state
interests. See generally the works cited in note 2 supra.
13. Cf. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (congressional interfer-
ence with state governmental action).
14. See the discussion of this point in Sedler. Reflections, supra note 3, at 256-58.
15. The term. "irreparable injury," is another of those concepts developed during the
separate administration of law and equity. To say that the plaintiff must demonstrate that he
or she will suffer "irreparable injury" if an injunction is not granted is merely the traditional
way of saying that the plaintiff must demonstrate the inadequacy of other remedies in order to
be entitled to affirmative or "equitable" relief.
16. This is the term used in the federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201
(amended 1976), and in many state declaratory judgment acts.
YOUNGER
TOLEDO LA W REVIEW
bility requirements of "case or controversy," 7 standing, 8 and ripeness,' 9
and are often coextensive. 2"
When a party seeks relief in the federal courts against state governmen-
tal action, the federalism component2 ' meets the remedies component, and
one or the other could be dominant. Even though the party may be
entitled to relief on the basis of remedies considerations, federalism
considerations could preclude such relief. Conversely, so long as the case
is justiciable under federal standards, federalism considerations could
militate in favor of relief, although remedies considerations might not
entitle the party to relief in the circumstances presented. 22 On the other
hand, the federalism considerations could cancel out, and the availability
of relief could be made to depend entirely on remedies considerations.
From a remedies standpoint, however, the dual system of federal and
state courts gives rise to a problem that finds its genesis in the historically
dual system of law courts and equity courts. Whenever there is a dual
court system, whether one of "law" and "equity" courts, or one of federal
and state courts, a party can seek relief in one court against proceedings
that are pending in the other court .2 3 With respect to the federal-state dual
17. Art. Ill's case or controversy requirement has traditionally been interpreted to
incorporate the concepts of adverseness between the parties, the prohibition against feigned
and collusive suits, the stricture against rendering advisory opinions, and the requirement ofa
present personal stake in the litigation as reflected in the mootness doctrine. It has more
recently been interpreted to incorporate the standing concept cf"injury in fact that is likely to
be redressed by a favorable decision." See Sedler, Standing and the Burger Court: An
Analysis and Some Proposals fbr Legislative Reform. 30 RtTGFRS L. RFV. 863, 867-68, 874-
76 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Sedler, Standing and the Burger Court].
18. As to the present law of standing, see generally Sedler, supra note 17. The
relationship between "irreparable injury" and standing in the first amendment context is
discussed in Sedler. Standing. Justiciahility and All That: A BehavioralAnalsis. 25 VAND. L.
Rt)v'. 479.494-97 (1972).
19. To the extent that ripeness involves the matter of present injury due to the challenged
action, it is closely related to the standing requirement of "injury in fact." Compare Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). with Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan. 406 U.S. 583 (1972).
20. See. e.g.. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
21. We will use "federalism" to denote both the "federalism" and the "comity" portion of
"equity, comity and federalism."
22. For example, when a state law has been invoked against a party in pending state
court proceedings, that party suffers "injury in fact" from that law for justiciability purposes.
See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327,332-33 (1977). so there is no justiciability bar to the federal
court's granting relief with respect to those proceedings.
23. The historical practice, based on the power of equity to proceed "in personaml."
resulted in the issuance of an injunction against a party, enjoining that party from institutinga
suit or enforcing a judgment, so that there was no direct interference with the processes of the
other court.
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court system, federalism considerations, rooted in the Supremacy Clause, 4
constitutionally preclude state courts from granting relief against the
continuation or initiation of proceedings in the federal courts,2 5 but render
fully constitutional federal court interference with pending as well as
threatened state court proceedings.26
II. FEDERAL "EQUITY" AND STATE GOVERNMENTAL
ACTION PRIOR TO Younger
When a federal court is asked to interfere with a pending state court
proceeding, it is essentially in the position of an historical "equity" court
that was asked to interfere with an action that was pending in the historical
"court of law.' Since the plaintiff in the federal "equity" action has been
brought before the state court, federal justiciability requirements are
satislied: the plaintiff suffers "injury in fact" from the action that is being
challenged. and a "live controversy" is presented between the plaintiff and
the state officials against whom relief is sought.2-8  But under traditional
remedies principles, it would be difficult for the federal plaintiff to obtain
relief in "equity" against the pending state court proceeding. The plaintiff
ordinarily could not satisfy the requirement of "irreparable injury," since
the "remedy at law" - the defense to the pending state court proceedings
would be "adequate" to protect the plaintiff's rights, and federal
constitutional defenses, like other defenses, could be asserted in that
proceeding. It was for this reason -the adequacy of the remedy by way of
defense to the pending proceeding - that "courts of equity" ordinarily
would not enjoin pending criminal prosecutions,:29 and this was equally
24. U.s. CONST..art. VI. § 2.
25. Donovan v. l)allas. 377 U.S. 408 (1964).
26. hI. This principle is illustrated by the authorization to enjoin pending state
proceedings in certain circumstances by 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1978). The most notable
circumstance, of course, is where the federal suit is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1974). See Mitchum v. Foster. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
27. When a party, seeks a federal court injunction against enforcement of a state court
injunction. the situation is analogous to the equity court's enjoining a party from enforcing a
judgment obtained "at law."
28. SeeJuidicev. Vail, 430 U.S. 327: Trainorv. Hernandez,431 U.S.434(1977). When
the state court proceedings against that plaintiff have terminated, however, and there is no
threat of future proceedings, the case is moot as to that plaintiff.
29. See, e.g.. Ivy v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1965): Fairchild v. Brock, 88 Cal.
App. 2d 425. 199 P.2d 9(1948): Cicchetti v. Anderson. 90 R.I. 76. 155 A.2d 64 (1959). "Where
prosecution has been initiated against a criminal-case defendant, there are often no good
reasons for equitable interference, since any defense to the case can be presented, and
YOUNGER
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true of federal "courts of equity. 3 " The refusal to grant relief against
pending criminal prosecutions included the granting of declaratory relief.
Since the validity of the law under which a party was being prosecuted
could be challenged in the criminal proceeding, an independent action for
declaratory relief was considered inappropriate.31
Yet, where the remedy by way of defense to the criminal prosecution
was not adequate to protect the rights of the "equity" plaintiff, the
requirement of "irreparable injury" was satisfied, and if the prosecution
was substantively unlawful, it would be enjoined. 2 One of the clearest
examples of a situation where the remedy by way of defense would not be
adequate was where the prosecution was brought in bad faith as part of a
scheme of harassment to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights, such
as freedom of expression. In such a situation, it was the prosecution itself
that caused the injury, so the remedy by way of defense would necessarily
be inadequate to protect the right in question.3 3
The "equity" court would also enjoin threatened criminal prosecutions
if the plaintiff could show that the prosecution was "imminent" and that
"irreparable injury" would occur if the prosecution was allowed to take
place. 34 In practice, "irreparable injury" to property rights usually would
be found to exist on the part of persons and enterprises subject to state
regulatory laws, and the courts would regularly entertain actions challeng-
ing the constitutionality of those laws.35  As Professor Wechsler has
demonstrated so convincingly, the federal courts were no exception and in
a practically unbroken line of cases, the Supreme Court found threatened
"irreparable injury," justifying an affirmative suit challenging the constitu-
presented in the most orderly way, in the criminal prosecution itself." D. DOBBS, REMEDIES
113(1973).
30. See the discussion in Wechsler, supra note 2. at 753-62.
31. See, e.g., Reedv. Littleton, 275 N.Y. 150,9 N.E.2d 814(1937).
32. See, e.g., Board of Commissioners v. Orr, 181 Ala. 308.61 So. 920(1913); Fairmont
Foods Co. v. City of Duluth, 261 Minn. 189, 1II N.W.2d 342(1961): Huntworth v. Tanner, 87
Wash. 670, 152 P. 523 (1915).
33. See, e.g., Kenyon v. City ofChicopee, 320 Mass. 528, 70 N.E.2d 241 (1946). See also
Sobol v. Perez, 289 F. Supp. 392 (E.D. La. 1968).
34. See the discussion and review of cases in Whitten. Federal Declaratoryp and
Injunctive Interference with State Court Proceedings: The Suprenle Court and the Litn its of
Judicial Discretion, 53 N.C.L. REV. 591,600-16 (1975).
35. See, e.g., Doyle v. Clark, 220 nd. 271,41 N.E.2d 949 (1942).
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tionalitv of state regulatory laws." With the enactment of the Federa
Declaratory ,ludgment Act, 7 declaratory relief was also available."
Thus, the notion that "equity will not enjoin enforcement of th
criminal law," 3" is simply inaccurate. Whenever the remedy by way c
defense to a pending criminal prosecution was not adequate to protect th
rights in question, there was "irreparable injury" and injunctive relief wa
available. When there was no pending proceeding at the time the sui
seeking injunctive or declaratory relief was brought, the plaintiff had t,
show "threatened irreparable injury" or an "actual controversy," but, as
practical matter, it was usually sufficient if the activity in which the plaintil
wished to engage was subject to the law's restrictions. The federal court,
sitting as "equity" courts, functioned in the same manner as their stat
court counterparts. With respect to federal relief against pending stat
court proceedings, the federal plaintiff ordinarily could not show that th
remedy by way of defense to the pending state court proceeding would b
an inadequate means of protecting the federal right in question, and it wa
for this reason rather than because of "federalism" considerations tha
federal courts would not enjoin pending state court proceedings.4 0  Bu
"irreparable injury" and "actual controversy" frequently could be show
when the federal plaintiff was seeking prospective relief against th
enforcement of state laws, and the federal courts regularly entertainei
affirmative actions to determine the constitutionality of those laws.4
36. See the discussion in Wechsler, supra note 2, at 753-13. While Ex parte Young, 2(
U.S. 123 (1908), is the "classic example," Professor Wechsler points out that prior to Youn
the Court had sanctioned affirmative actions challenging the constitutionality of sta
regulation of railroad rates. Id. at 757-62.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (amended 1976).
38. See the discussion of this point by Justice Brennan in Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 8
93, 111-15 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
39. In Younger, Justice Black, while intimating that equitable relief against enforcemel
of the criminal law was "extraordinary," nonetheless was careful to state the princip
correctly with respect to relief against pending prosecutions: "courts of equity should not ac
and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party hl
an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief
401 U.S. at 43-44.
40. See Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927). Note, however, that prior I
Mitchum, the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1978), was seen by some courts as
limitation on the power of the federal courts to enjoin pending state court proceedings. Se
e.g., Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964).
41. See note 36 supra. As the Court stated in Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 14
(1924): "equitable jurisdiction exists to restrain criminal prosecutions under unconstitution
enactments, when the prevention of such prosecutions is essential to the safeguarding of righ
of property." See also the discussion in Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 214-15 (1923)
YOUNGER
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Federal judicial relief against enforcement of state laws then was available
.o the same extent as it was available against enforcement of federal laws,42
ind there generally were no federalism considerations preventing federal
udicial relief against state governmental action.
This is where things stood in 1965 when Dombrowski v. Plister43 was
lecided. The facts and holding of that case have been dissected so many
:imes that no useful purpose would be served by doing so again here."
Nor is it necessary to discuss again my analysis of Dombrowski from the
-emedial-political perspective. 4 5 Suffice it to say that while Dombrowski
nvolved a federal court injunction against state criminal prosecutions and
was interpreted as authorizing injunctive relief against pending as well as
:hreatened prosecutions.46 doctrinally at least, the "breakthrough" was in
remedies terms rather than in federalism terms.47  Dombrowski redefined
'irreparable injury" in the first amendment context to include the "chilling
effect" resulting from actual or threatened prosecution under a law "void
:n its face.",41 In this sense it was the remedial concomitant to the
• 49
substantive "void on its face" doctrine. This meant that when a party was
prosecuted under a law that was allegedly "void on its face" in violation of
;he first amendment, the prosecution itself caused "irreparable injury,"
because it created a "chilling effect" on the exercise of first amendment
rights by that party and by others.5 ° Since this was so, the remedy by way
42. The Three-Judge Court Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2281 et seq. (repealed 1976), it should be
noted, also required the convening of a three-judge court when injunctive relief was sought
igainst the enforcement of a federal statute on grounds of its unconstitutionality.
43. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
44. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 2, at 1105-16; Sedler, Reflections, supra note 3, at 237-42;
Wechsler, supra note 2, at 835-45. See also Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State
Court Proceedings.: The Significance ofDombrowski, 48 TEx. L. REv. 535 (1970).
45. See note 5 supra.
46. See the discussion and review of cases in Wechsler, supra note 2, at 861-66.
47. See the discussion in Fiss, supra note 2, at I I l-12; Sedler, Reflections, supra note 3,
243-45.
48. See the discussion in Sedler, Reflections, supra note 3, at 244-45.
49. As Professor Fiss has noted, "The central contribution of Dombrowski was its
inkage of irreparable injury and overbreadth." Fiss, supra note 2, at 1112.
50. As to the relationship between the "void on its face" doctrine and jus tertii standing,
see the discussion in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-13 (1973), where the Court
noted: "Litigants, therefore, are permitted to challenge a statute [on its face] not because their
awn rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption
that the statute's very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
-onstitutionally protected speech or expression." Id. at 612. See also the discussion in
;edler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J.
i99, 612-26 (1962).
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of defense to the prosecution was necessarily inadequate to protect first
amendment rights, and the federal "equity" court could grant relief against
the prosecution.
This meant in practice that there would be substantial federal judicial
intervention in pending state court criminal proceedings. The defendant
in the criminal proceeding, once it was initiated,5 could bring an affirma-
tive action in the federal district court to challenge the constitutionality of
the law under which the prosecution was brought. 2  Under the substan-
tive aspect of the "void on its face" doctrine, it did not matter, of course,
whether the plaintiff's conduct itself was entitled to constitutional protec-
tion. If the statute was unconstitutional on its face, the prosecution under
it was unconstitutional too. In case after case the federal courts enter-
tained challenges to pending state prosecutions under the "void on its face"
aspect of Dombrowski,53 and not infrequently granted relief against
them.1
4
Equally significant was the availability of the Dombrowski-type suit to
obtain relief against threatened criminal prosecutions or other governmen-
tal action on the part of the federal government as well as the states. 5  The
same "chilling effect" that could satisfy the remedies requirement of
threatened "irreparable injury" also satisfied the justiciability requirement
of standing.16  The Dombrowski-type suit was a part of the Warren
51. The initiation of the prosecution would satisfy the justiciability requirement of
"injury in fact."
52. As a practical matter, then, Dombrowski gave the federal district courts the primary
responsibility for protecting first amendment rights.
53. See note 36 supra.
54. Usually the relief would take the form of a declaratory judgment that the law was
unconstitutional, although in certain cases injunctive relief was granted as well. Compare
Kirkwood v. Ellington, 298 F. Supp. 461 (W.D. Tenn. 1969), with McSurely v. Ratliff. 282 F.
Supp. 848 (E.D. Ky. 1967). Relief was also granted against the enforcement of state court
injunctions in civil proceedings where the injunctions were "void on their face," because they
included constitutionally-protected conduct within their prohibition. See, e.g.. Macheskvv.
Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969).
55. See the discussion in Sedler, Wake, supra note 3, at 256-58. The leading case in
this regard is National Student Assoc. v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1969), where the
court enjoined Selective Service officials from enforcing the "Hershey Directive," because ol
the "chilling effect" that it would have on war protest by draft registrants.
56. See the discussion of this point in Sedler, Standing. Justiciabilitv and All Thatr suprc
note 18, at 495-97. Prior to Dombrowski, affirmative actions in the federal courts to protect
first amendment rights were fairly rare, in large part because of the restrictive notion o1
standing enunciated in United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). which indicated
that a person could not challenge a statute on first amendment grounds unless he or she had
actually violated its prohibitions. After Dombrowski, standing was conferred because of the
YOUNGER
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Court's efforts to broaden accessibility to the federal courts, here in the
context of protecting first amendment rights, and complemented the
Court's lowering ofjusticiability bars in otherareas. 7 As I have discussed
more fully elsewhere,5s not only was the availability of the Dombrowski-
type suit to protect dissent and social change effort from repressive and
unconstitutional governmental action crucial to the civil rights struggle of
the early 1960's in the South, but it likewise provided legal protection for
the anti-war movement and the more sweeping movement for social change
that took place in the late 1960's and early 1970's as well. In my view, this
contributed to its partial undoing in Younger.59
There was a federalism component to Dombrowski, but it was pointed-
ly ignored by the majority,60 as it had been bY the Supreme Court ever since
Ex parte Young.6 ' On the assumption that the prosecution in Dombrows-
ki caused "irreparable injury" to first amendment rights,62 why could not
relief be given by the state "equity" courts, as Justice Harlan asked in his
dissent?63 The same question, ironically enough, was asked by the first
Justice Harlan in his dissent in Exparte Young.64 Although the Court in
the years between Ec parte Young and Dombrowski emphasized federal-
ism considerations when it said that federal courts could not intervene in
chilling effect suffered by a person who was subject to the statute's prohibitions, and as one
court observed: "[S]ubsequent case law weakened Mitchell as precedent in First Amendment
cases. [since] Mitchell was decided prior tojudicial recognition of the so-called 'chilling effect'
doctrine." National Assoc. of Letter Carriers v. Blount, 305 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D.D.C. 1969),
appealdismissed, 400 U.S. 801 (1970). See also Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
57. As to the relationship between Dombrowski and the liberalized law of standing, see
the discussion in Sedler, Standing, Justiciabilit' and All That, supra note 18, at 495-97. As to
the liberalization of the law of standing and the removal of other justiciability bars by the
Warren Court, see the discussion id. at 481-88.
58. Sedler, Reflections. supra note 3, at 258-61.
59. Sedler, Wake, supra note 3. at 8-13.
60. See the discussions in Fiss, supra note 2, at 1114-15; Wechsler, supra note 2, at 839-
40.
61. As Professor Wechsler has observed: "But we are not informed why lower federal
courts should lend a hand if state equity is so empowered. Yet that is the paramount
question. The failure of the Court to confront this question did not originate in Dombrows-
ki. It had been the persistent failure of every Supreme Court decision since it all began in In re
Sawyer in 1888." Wechsler. supra note 2, at 839.
62. It should be noted that in Dombrowski the plaintiffs were in effect seeking relief
against threatened rather than pending criminal prosecutions, since the charges out of which.
Dombrowski arose had been dismissed prior to the institution of the federal suit. See the
discussion in Sedler, Reflections, supra note 3, at 250.
63. 380 U.S. at 499-500.
64. Ex parte Young. 209 U.S. 123, 176(1908) (Harlan, J.. dissenting).
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pending state court prosecutions, 5 and, in those few cases where it failed to
find "irreparable injury" in regard to a threatened prosecution,6 6 it never
explained why those same federalism considerations did not dictate
"abstention"" in all cases challenging state governmental action so that the
state "equity" courts could protect federal constitutional rights. Instead,
as in Dombrowski, whenever it found that the federal plaintiff made out a
case for injunctive or declaratory relief, it assumed that it was proper for
the federal "equity" court to grant that relief.61 In Dombrowski, Justice
Harlan, joined by Justice Clark, articulated precisely those federalism
considerations which ordinarily would not allow an affirmative action in
the federal courts challenging the constitutionality of state criminal laws
and seeking to enjoin their present or threatened enforcement. 69  This
view, apparently shared by Justice Black, was to surface in Younger and its
progeny,78 but it has been consistently rejected by the Court.7'
From a federalism standpoint then, Dombrowski was consistent with
the line of cases going back to Exparte Young and beyond.,72 holding that
when a plaintiff in a federal suit challenging the constitutionality of state
65. See. e.g.. Stefanelli v. Minard. 342 U.S. 117(1952).
66. See, e.g.. Watsonv. Buck, 313 U.S. 387(1941); Bealv. Missouri Pac. R.R.,312 U.S.
45 (1941); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926). As Professor Wechsler has clearly
demonstrated, these cases were inconsistent with the Exparte Young line of cases. and were
effectively repudiated in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), where the Court did not
question the availability of affirmative relief in the federal courts to challenge the constitution-
ality of a state regulatory statute at the suit of one subject to its prohibitions, although it
upheld the statute on the merits. Wechsler, supra note 2, at 826-27.
67. "Abstention" has sometimes been used to refer to the refusal of the federal courts to
intervene in state court proceedings. The more common use of the term is in connection with
"Pullman abstention," which refers to the deferral of the exercise of federal court jurisdiction
pending an interpretation of state law by the state courts. See generally the discussion o
"Pullman abstention" in England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411.
415-16(1964).
68. Seethe discussion in Fisssupra note 2, at 1116-17: Wechsler, supra note 2, at 810-13.
69. As Justice Harlan stated:
Underlying the Court's major premise that criminal enforcement of an overly broad
statute affecting rights of speech and association is in itself a deterrent to the free
exercise thereof seems to be the unarticulated assumption that state courts will not
be as prone as federal courts to vindicate constitutional rights promptly and
effectively. Such an assumption should not be indulged in the absence of a showing
that such is apt to be so in a given case. No showing of that kind has been made.
380 U.S. at 499 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
70. See the discussion in Fiss, supra note 2, at 1105.
71. Justice Rehnquist on the present Court has been the most articulate proponent of
this view.
72. As to the cases prior to E.vparte Young. see Wechsler, supra note 2. at 753-62.
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governmental action satisfies the remedies criteria for injunctive or declara-
tory relief, federalism considerations do not preclude the granting of such
relief. The breakthrough of Dombrowski was in the redefinition of
"irreparable injury" in the first amendment context, and the increased
federal judicial interference with state governmental action that followed
after Donmbrowski was the result of that redefinition.
Ill. Younger AND ITS PROGENY: THE ADMIXTURE OF
EQUITY, COMITY AND FEDERALISM
Like Dombrowski, so much has been written about Younger v. Harris73
and the" Younger sextet, 74 that again no useful purpose would be served by
dissecting these cases at length.75  While I have also discussed Younger
from the remedial-political perspective, 76 and the matter of satisfying the
Younger criteria in practice,77 what I want to focus on now is the admixture
of remedies and federalism considerations as they were articulated by the
Court in Younger.
From a remedies standpoint, what the Court did in Younger was to
eliminate the "void on its face" aspect of Dombrowski in regard to federal
relief against pending state court criminal proceedings. The fact that the
law under which a party was being prosecuted was allegedly "void on its
face" was held no longer to satisfy the remedies requirement of "irreparable
injury."" Facial invalidity would have to be asserted as a defense in the
73. 401 U.S. 37(1971).
74. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), dealt with declaratory relief against a
pending state court criminal prosecution, and will be discussed notes 80-81 infra and
accompanying text. Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971), dealt with relief against threatened
prosecutions, and will be discussed notes 94-96 infra and accompanying text. The other three
cases, Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216(1971), Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200(1971), and Perez
v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971), dealt with the application of Younger in the specialized
context of state obscenity prosecutions and will not be discussed in the present article.
75. In addition to the works cited in note 2 supra, see Geltner, Some Thoughts on the
Limiting of Younger v. Harris, 32 OHIO ST. L.J 744 (1971); Maraist, Federal Intervention in
State Criminal Proceedings: Dombrowski, Younger, and Beyond, 50 TEx. L. REv. 1324
(1972).
76. Sedler, Wake. supra note 3, at 8-13.
77. Id. at 23-44.
78. As it had been in practice priorto Younger (see note 7 supra), and, as, it is submitted,
was impliedly recognized by the Supreme Court in Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611(1968),
when the Court dealt with the claim of bad faith enforcement only after it had found the
statute under which the prosecution was brought to be facially valid. See the discussion of
this point in Sedler, Wake, supra note 3, at 4-5. As Professor Wechsler has observed, "It was
not the lower federal judiciary which had misconceived Dombrowski but the Supreme Court
in Younger which altered it." Wecbsler. supra note 2, at 887.
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pending state court proceeding. Left intact though was the "bad faith an,
harassment" aspect of Dombrowski, which, as the Court noted, was i
accord with traditional concepts of "irreparable injury." 7 9 In the compar
ion case of Samuels %'. Mackell, ° the Court, again in accord with traditior
al remedies concepts," held that where injunctive relief was not availabl
against a pending criminal prosecution, declaratory relief was not availabl
either.
The admixture problem arose when Justice Black, writing for th
Court, discussed the reasons for the "longstanding public policy again,
federal court interference with state court proceedings."8 2 In so doing, h
fused remedies considerations and federalism considerations, with th
emphasis on the latter. As to the remedies considerations, he referred t
the "basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should nc
act, and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecutior
when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffe
irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.", 3 As pointed out previousl3
Dombrowski clearly was a departure from traditional notions of"irrepara
ble injury" where first amendment rights were involved8 4 and the Cout
was now returning to the traditional notions of "irreparable injury" in thi
context. Once it had done so, there was no reason for it to go further: sinc
a case for affirmative relief had not been alleged under the restorei
traditional criteria of "irreparable injury," the complaint should have bee
dismissed. Nor, from a remedies standpoint, would there be any reason t,
distinguish between affirmative relief against pending criminal prosecu
tions and affirmative relief against pending civil proceedings. s since 1
79. 401 U.S. at50. See also the discussion of this point in Sedler. Reflections. suprano
3, at 244, where it was observed that. "The 'harassment' or 'bad faith' rule of Dombrowski w
in accord with traditional principles governing the affirmative propriety of injunctive reli
and broke no new ground." To the same effect, see Soifer and Magill. supra note 2. at 116
"The actual holding of Younger and its companion cases, that absent bad faith or harassmer
federal equitable relief is barred once criminal proceedings have commenced in state coui
was supportable by a relatively unbroken line of precedent of respectably ancient vintage."
80. 401 US. 66(1971).
81. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
82. 401 U.S. at 43.
83. /d. at 43-44.
84. See the discussion, notes 48-50 supra and accompanying text.
85. This may have been necessary in order to obtain a majority. Justices Stewart ar
Harlan, concurring in Younger, stated that the outcome might have been different if asta
civil proceeding were pending. 401 U.S. at 54-55 (Stewart, J., concurring). In the oth
concurring opinions in the "Younger sextet," it was also stressed that it was a crimin
prosecution against which relief was sought.
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both instances affirmative relief would not be available unless it could be
shown that the remedy by way of defense to the pending proceeding was
not adequate to protect the right in question.
Justice Black, however, was determined to stress the federalism consid-
erations that were at the heart of the Harlan-Clark dissent in Dombrowski.
He went on:
This underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering
with criminal prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital considera-
tion, the notion of'comity,' that is, a proper respect for state functions, a
recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of
separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the
National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are
left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways. This,
perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to describe it, is referred to by
16many as'Our Federalism ....s.
In view of this "even more vital consideration," said Justice Black,
whenever federal relief was sought against a pending state court criminal
proceeding, even "irreparable injury" was insufficient to justify relief unless
it was "both great and immediate.""7
Justice Black never explained the difference between "ordinary irrepar-
able injury" and "great and immediate irreparable injury," and it is difficult
to fathom what that difference would be. He noted cost and inconvenience
of having to defend against a single prosecution did not constitute
"irreparable injury," as the courts had long held, so presumably here he was
referring to "ordinary irreparable injury." But he then cited the "bad faith
and harassment" facts of Dombrowski as an illustration of the "kind of
irreparable injury, above and beyond that associated with the defense of a
single prosecution brought in good faith that had always been considered
sufficient to justify federal intervention,"" so presumably he was saying
that this amounted to "great and immediate irreparable injury." But, this
was the same kind of "irreparable injury" that traditionally had been found
sufficient to justify relief against a pending prosecution, so it does not
differ from "ordinary irreparable injury." The purported distinction
between "ordinary irreparable injury" and "great and immediate irrepara-
ble injury" was further eroded by Justice Black's subsequent observations
86. 401 U.S. at 44 (emphasis added).
87. /d. at 45 (quoting from Fenner v. Boydkin. 271 U.S. 240. 243-44 (1926)).
88. /d. at 48.
89. See note 33 supra.
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that "[t]here may, of course be extraordinary circumstances in which the
necessary irreparable injury can be shown even in the absence of the usual
prerequisites of bad faith and harassment," 90 and that "[O]ther unusual
situations calling for federal intervention might also arise." 9' The purport-
ed distinction then becomes non-existent, and it seems clear that Justice
Black was simply trying to weight the federalism component of Younger
and to get the "behavioral message" across to the lower federal courts that
they should not find "irreparable injury" lightly.
What Dombrowski was all about was the first amendment. In
Dombrow ski the Court expanded the concept of "irreparable injury" in the
first amendment context to include the "chilling effect" on the exercise of
first amendment rights that could result from prosecutions under facially
invalid laws. It was the existence of those laws which created the
impermissible "chilling effect" on first amendment rights, and, in Dom-
browski, the Court held that the values embodied in the first amendment
not only required that a party prosecuted under such a law be permitted to
attack it "on its face, 92 but in addition that the party be entitled to bring a
affirmative action to enjoin the prosecution. Since such suits could be
brought in the federal courts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this meant that
federal courts could enjoin pending state court criminal prosecutions, but
this was only because affirmative relief, as opposed to the defense to the
criminal prosecution, was considered necessary to protect first amendment
rights.
What Younger did was to remove this additional source of protection
for first amendment rights, and in this regard it was reflective of the Court's
growing disenchantment with "chilling effect" and with the far-reaching
implications of the "void on its face" doctrine. Indeed, some members of
the Court were arguing that the "void on its face" doctrine should be
abandoned as a substantive defense to a criminal prosecution.93  This
90. 401 U.S. at 53.
91. Id. at 54. Justice Black also indicated that federal relief was proper if the statute
under which the prosecution was brought was "flagrant and patently unconstitutional." Id.
at 53-54 (quoting from Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387. 402 (1941)). As to the meaning of
"flagrant and patent unconstitutionality," see the discussion in Sedler, Wake, supra note 3, at
42-44. The fact that suit would be brought under such a law would be strong evidence of bad
faith.
92. This would mean that the law will be declared invalid without regard to whether the
conduct of the assailant itself was constitutionally protected in the circumstances presented.
See the discussion note 50 supra and accompanying text.
93. See. e.g.. the dissent ofJ ustice Blackmun,joined by Chiefi ustice Burger, in Gooding
v. Wilson. 405 U.S. 518, 534-37 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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disenchantment was further reflected by the Court's decision in Botle v.
Landrv, 94 another companion case to Younger, where it held, following a
rather convoluted analysis of the facts, 95 that allegations of "chilling effect"
alone were insufficient tojustify relief against future enforcement of facially
invalid laws. In Laird v. Tatum, 9' decided the following year, the Court
again restricted "chilling effect," this time in regard tojusticiability. when it
held that alleged "chilling effect" on the exercise of first amendment rights
due to military surveillance of civilian protest activity was insufficient to
present a justiciable controversy unless the plaintiffs could show that their
own activity was in fact "chilled" by the challenged surveillance." And in
Broadrick v. Oklahoma,99 decided in 1973, the Court limited the substan-
tive scope of the "void on its face" doctrine, where the challenged law did
not by its terms regulate expression, to claims of "substantial over-
breadth."'00
What all of this indicates is that the thrust of Younger was directed
against Dombrowskis expanded concept of"irreparable injury" in the first
amendment context. Seen in this light Younger, like Dombrowski, was
about the first amendment, and Justice Black's invocation of federalism
concerns, while important perhaps to certain members of the Court, was
not central to the decision of that case. Younger was simply the opening
wedge in the Court's effort to limit "chilling effect" as a basis for challenging
governmental action - federal as well as state - as violative of the first
amendment. 0' If this analysis is correct, Younger, no more than Dom-
94. 401 U.S. 77(1971).
95. See the discussion of this point in Sedler, Wake, supra note 3, at 18-20.
96. In Younger, the other plaintiffs had alleged a "chilling effect" on the exercise of their
first amendment rights solely because of the prosecution of harris, which the Court, of course.
found insufficient to satisfy the requirement of"threatened irreparable injury." 401 U.S. at
42.
97. 408 U.S. I (1972).
98. The holding has a "Catch 22" ring about it. You cannot bring a suit unless you have
been "chilled," but if you have been "chilled," by definition, you will be "chilled" from bringing
a suit.
99. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
100. "[T]he overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well.judged
in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." i. at 622 (quoting from CSC v.
National Assoc. of Letter Carriers. 413 U.S. 548. 615-16 (1973)). H owever. when the statute
by its terms regulates or proscribes expression rather than conduct, the "void on its face"
doctrine applies without regard to "substantial overbreadth." See Lewis v. New Orleans II,
415 U.S. 130(1974).
101. See the discussion of the first amendment implications of the decision in the dissent
of Justice Douglas, 401 U.S. at 58-60 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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hrowski, altered the federalism component of Ex parte Young, and
imposed no federalism considerations that would operate to prevent
federal judicial relief against state governmental action. '2
The validity of this analysis is suggested if not demonstrated by
Mitchuni v. Foster, ' decided the year after Younger, in which only
federalism considerations were involved. There, a unanimous court'
0 4
held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was a statutorily authorized exception to 28
U.S.C. § 2283, so that a federal court was not precluded from enjoining a
pending state criminal prosecution if the Younger criteria were satisfied.
In so doing, the Court in effect answered the federalism question that it
had ignored in Dombrowski, just as it had in Ev parte Young, and the
reasons it gave for its holding in Mitchuni indicate why the question
properly could be ignored: it is answered by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 itself. The
federalism question is why, assuming that entitlement to affirmative relief is
shown from a remedies standpoint, should not that relief be given by the
state courts since the challenge is to state governmental action? The
answer to that question is that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 imposes on the federal
courts the primary responsibility for the protection of federal constitution-
al rights.' 5  As Justice Stewart, writing for the Court. stated after
reviewing the legislative history of § 1983 and the fourteenth amendment:
Section 1983 was thus a product of a vast transformation from the
concepts of federalism that had prevailed in the late 18th century when the
anti-injunction statute was enacted. The very purpose of § 1983 was to
102. By this is meant that if the federal plaintiffcan show affirmative entitlement to relief
from a remedies standpoint, that remedy can be pursued in the federal courts notwithstanding
that a challenge to state governmental action is involved.
103. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
104. In a separate concurrence. Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White and
Blackmun, emphasized that Mitchum did not undercut the Younger principles of "equity,
comity and federalism" that apply when federal judicial interference is sought against a
pending state court criminal proceeding. 407 U.S. at 244 (Burger. C.J., concurring).
Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate.
105. As the Court had earlier stated in Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241.248 (1967):
"In thus expanding federaljudicial power. Congress imposed the duty upon all levels
of the federal judiciary to give due respect to a suitor's choice of a federal forum for
the hearing and decision of his federal constitutional claims. lainly, escape from
that duty is not permissible merely because state courts also have the solemn
responsibility, equally with the federal courts.'. . to guard, enforce, and protect
every right granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States . . .,
.. . We vet like to believe that wherever the Federal courts sit, human rights under
the Federal Constituion are alwvavs a proper subject for adjudication, and that we
have not the right to decline the exercise of that jurisdiction simply because the rights
asserted mas be adjudicated in some other forum."
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interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as
guardians of the people's federal rights -- to protect the people from
unconstitutional action under color of state law, 'whether that action be
executive, legislative or judicial.' . . . And this Court long ago recog-
nized that federal injunctive relief against a state court proceeding can in
some circumstances be essential to prevent great, immediate, and irrepar-
able loss of a person's constitutional rights." 6
Thus. the Court rejected the federalism concerns that were expressed in the
Harlan-Clark dissent in Dombrowski and that were revived by Justice
Black in Younger. The purpose of § 1983 was to give all persons a federal
forum for the protection of federal constitutional rights, and impact of
"Our Federalism" in this regard is in favor of federal judicial interference
with state governmental action in order to protect federal constitutional
rights. 07
After seeming to remove federalism- considerations as a limitation on
the power of the federal courts to protect federal constitutional rights from
state interference, Justice Stewart nevertheless referred to the principles of
"equity, comity, and federalism" enunciated in Younger "that must restrain
a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding."O° The
rationale of Mitchum would indicate that there are no federalism
considerations that would preclude federal adjudication (indeed, the
federalism considerations may point to federal adjudication), and at a
minimum, if the federal plaintiff is entitled to affirmative relief from a
remedies standpoint, such relief should be forthcoming. The failure to
dispel the admixture of "equity, comity and federalism" in Mitchum, as we
will see, has led to continued confusion as to the proper basis for federal
judicial interference with state governmental action, and to that extent, has
undercut the federalism holding of Mitchum.'
0 9
In Younger, Justice Black, despite the articulation of federalism
concerns, emphasized that the holding was limited to interference in
pending state court criminal prosecutions, a point noted by Justice
106. 407 U.S. at 242 (citing Dombrowski and Exparte Young).
107. The principle that a federal plaintiff is entitled to the choice of a federal forum to
challenge the validity of state governmental action, even if that action is taken in violation of
state law, was recognized earlier in Monroe v. Pape. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
108. 407 U.S. at 243.
109. The confusion was compounded by the Court's citation to cases such as Fenner.
Beal and Buck. which were departures from the Court's general approach to relief against
threatened enforcement of state law. 407 U.S. at 243. See the discussion in Wechsler. supra
note 2, at 798-8 13.
110. 401 U.S. at 53-54.
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Stewart in Miichum.'"' It may well have been that a majority could not be
mustered in Younger to extend its criteria to all pending state court civil
proceedings.''2  Rut from a remedies standpoint, the "irreparable injury"
requirement would bar intervention in pending state court civil proceed-
ings in the same manner as it would in pending state court criminal
proceedings. If the Court in Mitchum had explained Younger solely in
remedies terms, there would thus be no reason to distinguish between
pending civil and pending criminal proceedings.
Not only did the Court not do this, but its holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2283
did not bar federal injunctive relief against a pending state court proceed-
ing potentially extended suits seeking such relief beyond the first amend-
ment context of Dombrowski and into civil proceedings.' 13 Prior to
Domhrowski. the Court had consistently refused to intervene in pending
state court criminal proceedings in order to protect other federal constitu-
tional rights, such as those guaranteed by the fourth amendment, for the
traditional remedies reason that those rights could adequately be protected
by way of defense to the pending proceeding. 14 Lurking in the back-
ground. however, was the possible bar of 28 U.S.C. § 2283. Now that this
bar had been removed in Mitchum, it could be expected that federal relief
would be sought against pending state court proceedings, civil as well as
criminal, on the ground that federal constitutional rights would be violated
in those proceedings. And in civil proceedings, it was not clear whether
"irreparable injury" was a requirement at all.
The lower federal courts, however, tended for the most part to read
Younger and Mitchum in remedies terms. A number of circuits have held
that the Younger criteria of "irreparable injury" apply to all pending civil
proceedings.''1 And while the lower federal courts have found "irrepara-
I11. 407U.S. at243.
112. See note 85 supra.
113. Following Dombrowski, relief was also granted against the enforcement of a state
court injunction issued in a civil proceeding on the ground that the injunction was "void on its
face." See note 54 supra.
114. See. e.g.. Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951), in which the Court also
articulated federalism concerns.
115. See Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,415 U.S. 983 (1974):
Duke v. Texas, 477 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974); Cousins v.
Wigoda, 463 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1972), stay denied, 409 U.S. 1201(1972); Louisville Area Inter-
Faith Comm. v. Nottingham Liquors, Ltd., 542 F.2d 652 (6th Cir. 1976). In Schlesinger v.
Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975), the Court held that Younger applied to court-martial
proceedings, basing the decision both on remedies considerations, and on "military necessi-
ty." which it analogized to the "equity, comity and federalism" of Younger.
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ble injury" in certain cases where a clear showing of "bad faith and
harassment" has been made," 16 this is not an easy showing to make, and the
practical effect of Younger has been to essentially prevent federal court
interference in pending state court proceedings.' This is the way things
were before Dombrowski, which, as we have said, only expanded "irrepar-
able injury" in the first amendment context, and the way they would be if
interference in pending proceedings were governed solely by remedies
considerations.
IV. RELIEF AGAINST FUTURE PROSECUTIONS:
Steffel LIMITS Younger
In Steffel v. Thompson, 1 " decided in 1974, the Court held that Younger
was not applicable when there was no pending state court proceeding, and
going further, that federal declaratory relief was available without regard
to the "irreparable injury" requirement for injunctive relief.'' 9 For
purposes of the federal declaratory judgment act, where a party desires to
engage in particular conduct and has been threatened with arrest if that
party does so, there is an "actual controversy" between that party and the
officials charged with the enforcement of that law. In Steffel, the plaintiff
had been distributing handbills at a shopping center and was threatened
with arrest by the police if he continued to do so. He left, but two days
later a companion was arrested for handbilling at the shopping center and
charged with a violation of the state trespass law. On these facts and in the
first amendment context in which the claim arose, the Court held that the
plaintiff had demonstrated "specific chilling effect" on the exercise of first
amendment rights, and thus could bring an affirmative action to challenge
the constitutionality of the trespass statute as applied to his activity. The
116. See, e.g.,Shawv. Garrison,467F.2d 113(5thCir. 1972),cert. denied,409U.S. 1024
(1972); Krahm v. Graham, 461 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1972); Duncan v. Perez, 445 F.2d 557 (5th
Cir. 1971); Kelly v. Gilbert, 437 F. Supp. 201 (D. Mont. 1976).
117. No useful purpose would be served by a string citation to cases where the allegations
of "bad faith" or "other irreparable injury" were found to be insufficient. The main Supreme
Court cases specifically dealing with "bad faith" and "other irreparable injury" are Kugler v.
Helfant, 421 U.S. 117 (1975), and Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
118. 415U.S.452(1974).
119. As regards declaratory relief, the remedies and justiciability requirements merge
completely, since the federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (amended 1976),
requires the showing of an "actual controversy," which is also what is required by the "case or
controversy" provision of art. IIl. The Court specifically noted this point in Steffel, 415 U.S.
at 458.
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holding was in accord with prior lower court cases that had found a
"specific chilling effect" in similar circumstances. 20
From a remedies standpoint, the holding illustrates the principle that
when a party wishes to engage in activities that are prohibited by a law and
prosecution has been threatened against the party if he or she engages in
such activities, that party is entitled to seek affirmative relief against its
enforcement. If a prosecution is imminent, as it was in Ex parte Young,
the party satisfies the requirement of "irreparable injury," and is entitled to
injunctive relief. If the party's activities are subject to the law, as, for
example, in Doe v. Bolton, 2 ' where a physician's practice of medicine was
subject to the state's anti-abortion law, the party is at least entitled to
declaratory relief. Steffel merely applied this principle in a first amend-
ment context. The threat of arrest if the plaintiff continued to handbill at
the shopping center, as well as the arrest of his companion for handbilling
there, showed that the conduct in which he wanted to engage was
considered by the state officials to be subject to the trespass law. Since he
refrained from that conduct in order to avoid prosecution, the threatened
enforcement created a "specific chilling effect" on the exercise of his first
amendment rights, and he was entitled to bring an affirmative action to
challenge the constitutionality of the law as applied to that activity.
121
Moreover, as the Court had long ago emphasized in Ex parte Young, a
party is not required to violate a law in order to challenge its constitutional-
ity; it is enough that enforcement has been threatened and the party
continues to engage in the desired activity. 123  And while the Court
emphasized that the traditional "irreparable injury" test for injunctive
relief is not necessarily the same as the "actual controversy" test for
declaratory relief, 2 4 this distinction may not be all that significant in
practice. Prior to Steffel, lower court cases had found in these circumstan-
ces that the prosecution was "imminent," thus satisfying the "irreparable
injury" requirement.125 More to the point perhaps, federal courts usually
120. These cases are discussed in Sedler, Wake, supra note 3. at 46-56. In the view of
Professor Fiss, Steffel represented the "triumph" ofthe strategy employed by Justice Brennan
in the "Younger sextet" to salvage as much of Dombrowski as was possible. Fiss, supra note
2, at 1129.
121. 410U.S. 179(1973).
122. As to "specific chilling effect." see also National Student Assoc. v. Hershey, 412
F.2d 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
123. See415U.S. at459.
124. Id. at468-72. SeealsoZwicklerv. Koota. 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
125. See. e.g.. Hull v. Petrillo, 439 F.2d 1184 (2d Cir. 1971 ).
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will only issue a declaratory judgment that a state or federal law is
unconstitutional, on the very realistic assumption that governmental
officials will not prosecute following such a declaration." 6
Again, federal declaratory and injunctive relief had always been
available against threatened enforcement of state law upon the suit by a
person subject to the law's restrictions.127 And again, from a remedies
standpoint, the criteria for relief against a threatened prosecution necessar-
ily differ from that applicable to relief against a pending prosecution.
When there is no prosecution pending, the plaintiff does not presently
have an "adequate remedy at law" by which to assert the claims that are
being asserted in the "equity" action. As the Court noted in Steffel:
[w]hile a pending state prosecution provides the federal plaintiff with a
concrete opportunity to vindicate his constitutional rights, a refusal on
the part of the federal courts to intervene when no state proceeding is
pending may place the hapless plaintiff between the Scylla of intentionally
flouting state law and the Charybdis of foregoing what he believes to be
constitutionally protected activity in order to avoid becoming enmeshed
in a criminal proceeding.'
28
Although the Court was referring to federal judicial relief against the
enforcement of a state law, the reasoning is equally applicable to federal
judicial relief against the enforcement of a federal law" 9 and for that matter
to state judicial relief against the enforcement of a state law.
From a federalism standpoint, however, it was significant to the Fifth
Circuit in Ste/jel that a plaintiff in a federal action was seeking relief against
the enforcement of a state law. That court concluded that: (1) Younger
made it clear that "irreparable injury" meant "bad faith and harassment"
126. SeeDoev. Bolton, 410U.S. 179(1973),and Roev. Wade,410U.S. 113(1973). As
the Court noted in Steffel:
In those two cases, we declined to decide whether the District Courts had properly
denied to the federal plaintiffs, against whom no prosecutions were pending,
injunctive relief restraining enforcement of the Texas and Georgia criminal abortion
statutes; instead, we affirmed the issuance of declaratory judgments of unconstitu-
tionality, anticipating that these would be given effect by state authorities.
415 U.S. at469. Similarly, in the Dombrowski era the relief usually would take the form of a
declaratory judgment of unconstitutionality. See note 54 supra.
127. See the discussion, notes 39-42 supra and accompanying text.
128. 415 U.S. at 462.
129. In Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Assoc. of Letter Carriers. 413 U.S. 548 (1973),
the Court simply assumed that federal employees could bring an affirmative action to
challenge the constitutionality of the Hatch Act without alleging that they had violated its
prohibitions, effectively completing the overruling of United Public Workers v. M itchell. 330
U.S. 75 (1947), in this regard.
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rather than "chilling effect," (2) that the Younger criteria of "irreparable
injury" applied to a request for injunctive relief against a threatened state
court prosecution as well as against a pending prosecution, and (3) that
Samuels v. Mackell, mandated that the same test apply to federal declara-
tory relief, since declaratory relief would normally disrupt the state
criminal justice system in the same manner as would injunctive relief. 3 °
While this admittedly was an extension of Younger, it was an extension
that was consistent with the federalism considerations that had been
articulated by Justice Black.
Again, these federalism considerations were in effect rejected by the
Court in Ste/fel, as they had been in a virtually unbroken line of cases from
Ex parte Young to Mitchum,' 3' but the Court, in explaining its rejection,
continued to adhere to the Younger admixture of "equity, comity and
federalism." Although noting that there was no adequate state remedy
when no state prosecution was pending, it also related the absence of a
pending state proceeding to federalism concerns. As the Court stated:
When no state criminal proceeding is pending at the time the federal
complaint is filed, federal intervention does not result in duplicative legal
proceedings or disruption of the state criminal justice system; nor can
federal intervention, in that circumstance, be interpreted as reflecting
negatively upon the state court's ability to enforce constitutional princi-
ples.
32
In any event, Steffel limits the applicability of Younger to pending state
court proceedings and says that federalism considerations are inapposite
when no state court proceeding is pending.
The remedies explanation of Younger and Steffel relates the distinction
between relief against a pending proceeding and relief against future
enforcement to the traditional concept of "adequate remedy at law."
When a pending prosecution has been brought in bad faith for the
purpose of harassing the plaintiff, it is the prosecution itself that causes the
"irreparable injury," and the remedy by way of defense is necessarily
inadequate to protect the plaintiff's rights."' So too, although there may
be a pending state court proceeding, if the claim that the plaintiff asserts in
the federal "equity" action cannot be asserted as a defense to what is in
130. See the discussion, 415 U.S. at 456-58.
131. See the discussion, notes 103-107 supra and accompanying text.
132. 415U.S. at462.
133. See particularly the discussion of this point in Shaw v. Garrison, 467 F.2d 113 (5th
Cir. 1972). cert. denied. 409 U.S. 1024 (1972).
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effect the pending state court "law" action, there again is no "adequate
remedy at law." In Gerstein v. Pugh,14 for example, the Supreme Court
allowed an affirmative action challenging the constitutionality of a state's
pre-trial detention procedures, noting that this issue could not be raised as
a defense to the state criminal prosecution.' If unconstitutional pre-trial
detention were a defense to the prosecution, which logically it should not
be, the plaintiff in the federal action would have had an adequate remedy by
way of defense to the state court proceeding and would not be entitled to
affirmative relief.'36  Similarly, in Gibson v. Berrvhill,'17 the Court held
that a federal court could enjoin pending proceedings before a state
administrative agency 38 when the charge was that the agency was incom-
petent by virtue of bias to adjudicate the issues before it, including, of
course, the issue of whether the proceedings were violative of due process
because of that bias. In remedies terms, the plaintiff did not have an
adequate remedy in the pending proceeding to assert the right that was
asserted in the suit for affirmative relief. But where the prosecution itself
does not cause "irreparable injury," and where the claims can be asserted
and fairly adjudicated in the pending proceeding, there is an "adequate
remedy at law," and affirmative relief is unnecessary.
131
When no prosecution is pending, the matter of "bad faith" in threaten-
ing a prosecution or the ability to assert the substantive claim in defense of
a prosecution not yet brought is completely irrelevant. The injury is
134. 420 U.S. 103(1975).
135. 420 U.S. at 108 n.9.
136. Whereas in Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977). utilization of the state court remedy
would enable the plaintiffs to obtain the relief sought in the federal court action. See the
discussion, notes 179-85 infra and accompanying text. As to adequacy of state court
remedies for these purposes, see discussion in Zeigler, supra note 2, at 292-98, 303-06.
In Flynt v. Leis, 574 F.2d 874 (6th Cir. 1978), the court held that Younger was no bar to an
affirmative action by out-of-state lawyers challenging the refusal ofa state courtjudge to allow
them to appear pro hac vice in a criminal case, nothing that while the defendants in the state
court action might have an adequate remedy by way of a sixth amendment claim in that
proceeding, no such remedy was available for vindication of the attorneys' rights.
137. 411 U.S. 564(1973).
138. The Court specifically left open the question of whether Younger applied to pending
state administrative proceedings. 411 U.S. at 574-75. The question was also left open in
Friedman v. Beame, 558 F.2d 1107 (2d Cir. 1977).
139. In Trainor v. Hernandez. 431 U.S. 434 (1977), the Court remanded the case for a
determination of whether the plaintiffcould challenge the attachment statute in the pending
state court proceeding.
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having to forego the desired activity because of the threat of prosecution,141
and it is this injury that entitles the plaintiff to affirmative relief.
The point to he emphasized is that the results in Younger and Steffelcan
be explained solely in remedies terms - "equity" - rather than in terms of
"equity, comity, and federalism," and this explanation is consistent with
the Court's prior doctrine and practice with respect to federal judicial
interference with the exercise of state governmental power. Federalism
considerations, as operating to bar federal judicial interference, it is
submitted, are negated by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This is reflected in Mitchum,
which authorizes the federal "equity" court to intervene in a pending state
court proceeding if the remedies requirement of "irreparable injury" is
satisfied, in Steffel, which holds that a federal court may grant relief against
the enforcement of a state law on the part of any person subject to its
restrictions, and in Younger, which merely holds that the alleged facial
invalidity of the law under which the prosecution is brought does not create
"irreparable injury" to first amendment rights.
V. DEVELOPMENTS AFTER Steffel
In the last four years the Supreme Court has decided a number of other
cases dealing specifically with what has simply come to be called
"Younger." It is my submission that the results in all of these cases, like the
results in Younger and Steffel, can be explained in remedies terms,
although the Court continues to articulate the admixture of "equity,
comity and federalism." The cases can be put into two categories: (i) cases
involving the applicability of the Younger criteria to non-criminal proceed-
ings; (2) cases defining the line between pending and non-pending proceed-
ings for Younger purposes and the relationship between them.
A. The Younger Criteria and Non-Criminal Cases
From a remedies standpoint, the Younger criteria which, in my view,
is just another way of saying "irreparable injury" - should apply to all
pending state court proceedings without regard to whether or not they are
criminal in nature, as a number of lower federal courts have held. 41 So
long as the proceeding was brought in good faith and the substantive claim
can be asserted effectively as a defense to that proceeding, there is an
140. In Exparte Young. the desired activity was charging the rates the railroad wanted to
charge: in Doe v. Bolion, it was performing abortions: in Stefil it was handbilling at the
shopping center.
141. See note 115 supra.
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adequate remedy "at law," and affirmative relief is unnecessary. Whether
that remedy is available in a criminal proceeding or a non-criminal
proceeding is completely irrelevant to the entitlement to affirmative relief.
This point is illustrated by cases where the defendant in a state court
injunction proceeding brings a federal court suit to enjoin enforcement of
that injunction. 142 In the heyday of Dombrowski, when facial invalidity
was equated with "irreparable injury," federal courts would enjoin enforce-
ment of state court injunctions that restrained protected first amendment
activity on the ground that they were "void on their face." 143  After
Younger, these injunctions were refused.1 44 Typical of such a case is
Louisville Area Inter-Faith Committee v. Nottingham Liquors, Ltd.
145
There, a state court had issued ex parte a broad injunction against
picketing near certain business premises. The defendants in the state court
action made no effort to dissolve the injunction. 46 They instead sought to
enjoin the state court plaintiffs from enforcing it by filing suit in federal
court, alleging that the state injunction violated the first and fourteenth
amendments. Prior to Younger, the federal court would have entertained
the suit and determined the constitutionality of the injunction. 14  None-
theless, the Sixth Circuit held that the Younger criteria applied to all
pending civil proceedings, invoking the now customary federalism
considerations 14 but also emphasizing that the plaintiffs in the federal
action had an adequate remedy in the state court by which they could raise
their constitutional claims.' 49  Other federal circuits have also held that
Younger applies to all pending civil proceedings. 50
The Supreme Court, however, has refrained from so holding, despite
three opportunities to do so, but in all of these cases it has held the Younger
criteria to be applicable in the case before it. The first of these cases was
142. Here the federal Court is in the analogous position of an equity court asked to enjoin
enforcement of a judgment "at law," although the judgment it is asked to enjoin is one
granting "equitable relief."
143. See Machesky v. Bizzel, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969).
144. See Duke v. Texas, 477 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974),
where the Fifth Circuit, which ordered the issuance of such an injunction in Machesky, held
that it was now barred from doing so by Younger.
145. 542 F.2d 652 (6th Cir. 1976).
146. Because it was issued exparte, it would be violative of the first amendment. Carroll
v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
147. See note 143 supra.
148. 542 F.2d at 653.
149. Id. at 654.
150. See note 115 supra.
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Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 5' decided in 1975. There, an Ohio prosecutor
brought a state court proceeding under a law that provided for the closure
for up to a year of any place determined to be a public nuisance. The
defendant was the operator of a theater that showed pornographic films,
many of which had been found to be obscene. The court ordered the
theater closed for a year. Rather than appeal that order, as could have
been done under Ohio law, the theater operator brought an affirmative
action for declaratory and injunctive relief in the federal court, alleging that
the use of the public nuisance law to close the theater was violative of the
first amendment. The three-judge federal district court, without discuss-
ing the applicability of Younger, found the closure to be violative of the
first amendment and granted injunctive relief.
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the cause to the district
court. Justice Rehnquist, writing, for the majority, stressed federalism
considerations, noting that "[w]e have consistently required that when
federal courts are confronted with requests for such relief [interference with
state civil functions], they should abide by standards of restraint that go
well beyond those of private equity jurisprudence." '  To Justice Rehn-
quist, this was because:
[i]ntereference with a state judicial proceeding prevents the state not only
from effectuating its substantive policies, but also from continuing to
perform the separate function of providing a forum competent to
vindicate any constitutional objections interposed against those policies.
Such interference also results in duplicative legal proceedings, and can
readily be interpreted "as reflecting negatively upon the state court's
ability to enforce constitutional principles." 53
But again, in accord with the now familiar admixture of federalism and
remedies considerations, he also noted that, "Younger, however, also rests
upon the traditional reluctance of courts of equity, even within a unitary
system, to interfere with a criminal prosecution."
'15 4
Although the present proceeding was not a criminal one, it was,
according to Justice Rehnquist, "more akin to a criminal prosecution than
are most civil cases," since the state was a party to the proceeding and the
proceeding was "both in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes
151. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
152. Id. at 603.
153. ki. at 604.
154. hi.
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which prohibit the dissemination of obscene materials." 55  Thus, "an
offense to the State's interest in the nuisance litigation is likely to be every
bit as great as it would be were this a criminal proceeding," 56 and Younger
was applicable.
57
The plaintiff had argued that there was no pending state court proceed-
ing within the meaning of Younger because the state court proceeding had
terminated at the time the federal suit was filed: a permanent injunction had
been issued and no appeal was taken from the judgment. In responding to
this argument, Justice Rehnquist invoked, as if they were related, what are
really very different concepts of "exhaustion of state remedies," and
"federal post-trial intervention designed to annul the results of a state
trial." According to Justice Rehnquist, a party in the plaintiff's position
"must exhaust his state appellate remedies before seeking relief in the
District Court, unless he can bring himself within one of the exceptions
specified in Younger."'151 Surely, however, Justice Rehnquist cannot be
suggesting that if a party to a state court civil proceeding has exhausted
state appellate remedies, that party may then bring an affirmative action in
the federal courts seeking to have that judgment set aside. This would be
federal post-trial intervention designed to annul the results of a state trial,
which is proscribed in a civil case by ordinary principles of resjudicata.159
Here, the state officials did not plead res judicata,"6 but clearly this is what
was involved. As Justice Rehnquist noted in a footnote, it ordinarily
would be difficult to consider the duration of Younger's restrictions after
entry of a state trial court judgment, without also considering the res
judicata implications of such a judgment,' 6' and as he specifically empha-
sized in another footnote, "[w]e in no way intend to suggest that . . .the
normal rules of res judicata and judicial estoppel do not operate to bar
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. The Court specifically refused to decide whether Younger was applicable to all
pending state court civil proceedings. Id. at 607. The plaintiff argued that since this was a
civil proceeding, there was no possibility of obtaining federal review collaterally, as there
would be in a criminal proceeding under the federal Habeus Corpus Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 et
seq. In Justice Rehnquist's view, this was irrelevant, since there was the possibility of direct
review in the Supreme Court, and in any event, " Younger turned on considerations ofcomity
and federalism peculiar to the fact that state proceedings were pending.... .. Id.
at 606.
158. Id. at 608 (emphasis added).
159. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners. 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
160. 420 U.S. at 607 n.19.
161. Id.
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relitigation in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of federal issues arising in
state court proceedings."'
6 2
It seems clear that Justice Rehnquist was talking about resjudicata, and
the invocation of the concept of "exhaustion of state remedies" was
misplaced. The concept of "exhaustion of state remedies" operates only
with respect to federal collateral review of state criminal proceedings,
because exhaustion of state remedies is required by the federal habeas
corpus act.163 In exchange for the exhaustion requirement, the normal
rules of resjudicata and collateral estoppel do not apply. 64 In the case of
proceedings brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, there is, of course, no
exhaustion requirement, 65 but resjudicata and collateral estoppel may be
applicable. In Huffman, all issues relating to the issuance of the injunction
that closed the theater for a year were subject to litigation in the state court
action, and whether or not state appellate remedies had been pursued, the
normal rules of resjudicata would prevent their relitigation in a subsequent
federal action. 1
66
The more interesting question, which was not presented in Huffman,
but as we will see subsequently, was in effect presented in Woolev v.
Maynard,6 ' concerns the res judicata or collateral estoppel effect of the
state court judgment in a subsequent federal suit involving the same
question that was litigated or could have been litigated in the state suit.
Suppose that in Huffman, after the year was up, the theater operator
reopened the theater and again showed pornographic films. He then
brought an affirmative suit in the federal court, alleging that the state
officials had threatened to enforce the public nuisance law against him
again, and sought a declaration that such enforcement would be unconsti-
tutional. Would he be barred by res judicata from asserting the claim in
the federal action, since (I) the parties were the same in both actions, and
(2) the constitutional question was litigated or could have been litigated in
the state court action? We will defer our consideration of this question
until we come to Woolev v. Maynard.
Why, may it be asked, did the Court in Huffinan not hold that Younger
162. Id. at 606 n.18.
163. 28 U.S.C. §2241. See generallv Preiserv. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.475(1973).
164. See generally Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
165. This point was emphasized in Huffman, but limited to the situation where there
were no pending state court proceedings. 420 U.S. at 609 n.21.
166. Cf Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
167. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
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applied to all civil proceedings, as remedies considerations would dictate.
and as the dissent feared it was going to do eventually? 6 s It may have been
that a majority could not yet be mustered to extend Younger to all civil
proceedings.' 69 and if this was so, it was because the Court was approach-
ing this question at least on the basis of federalism considerations. Justice
Brennan in dissent, joined by Justices Marshall and Douglas, argued that
the federalism considerations reflected in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and in the
decision in MitchuM mandated federal interference in all non-criminal
cases in order to protect federal constitutional rights."7
The position of the dissenters would carry the Court far beyond the
point where it was in Dombrowski. Dombrowski. as we have said,
expanded the concept of "irreparable injury" in the first amendment
context, but there was nothing in Dombrowski that would authorize
federal courts to intervene in pending state court proceedings, civil or
criminal, to protect other federal constitutional rights: this was something
the Court consistently had refused to do. As the Court specifically
noted in Dombrowski,"fi]n a variety of other contexts the Court has found
no special circumstances to warrant cutting short the normal adjudication
of constitutional defenses in the course of a criminal prosecution," 172 and
further, "[ilt is difficult to think of a case in which an accused could
properly bring a state prosecution to a halt while a federal court decides his
claim that certain evidence is rendered inadmissible by the Fourteenth
Amendment."'173 This would be equally true, of course, in regard to
pending state court civil proceedings. Again, unless the proceeding was
brought in bad faith or otherwise caused "irreparable injury," the remedy
by way of defense to the proceeding would be adequate to protect the rights
in question. including federal constitutional rights.
The position of the dissenters, however, was not based on the emana-
tions of DoMbrowski, but on the emanations of Mitchum. 174 Since the
Court in Mitchum held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was a statutorily authorized
exception to 28 U.S.C. § 2283, there would be no statutory federalism bar,
168. 420 U.S. at 613 (Brennan. J.. dissenting).
169. Recall that in Younger. Justice Stewart emphasized in his concurrence that
different considerations might apply in the case ofa pending civil proceeding. 401 U.S. at 54-
56 (Stewart. J.. concurring).
170. 420 U.S. at 615-18.
171. See, e.g.. Stefanelli v. Minard. 342 U.S. 117(1951).
172. 380U.S. at485.
173. h/. at 485 n.3.
174. See the discussion notes 27-31 supra and accompanying text.
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so to speak, to federal judicial interference in pending state court civil
proceedings (or for that matter, in pending state court criminal proceed-
ings) in order to determine federal constitutional claims. But there would
still be the remedies requirement of "irreparable injury," which ordinarily
would be absent if those claims could be asserted in the pending state court
proceeding.1 75 In other words, if federal courts are to interfere in pending
state court civil proceedings to protect federal constitutional rights, it is
because federalism considerations mandate such interference despite the
absence of the remedies requirement of"irreparable injury." The majority
position on the Court appears to be that federalism considerations militate
against interference, at least in some proceedings. In this situation, the
lines are clearly drawn on the basis of differing conceptions of "Our
Federalism," but the admixture of "equity, comity and federalism" that the
Court has consistently invoked in all of these cases may obscure the nature
of the division and divert the Court from facing it directly.
In two cases decided in 1977, Juidice v. Vail,176 and Trainor v.
Hernandez,7 7 the Court again stopped short of extending Younger to all
civil cases, but again held that Younger was applicable to the case in
question. Juidice involved a challenge to the constitutionality of state civil
contempt proceedings, while Trainor involved a challenge to the constitu-
tionality of state attachment proceedings. In Juidice the parties in the
state court action were private litigants; in Trainor the attachment proceed-
ings were instituted by the state in connection with a civil suit to recover
fraudulently obtained welfare payments.
Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the opinion in Huffman, also wrote for
the Court in Juidice. Noting that although the Court in Huffinan had not
extended Younger to all civil proceedings, he saw Huffman as emphasizing
that the "more vital consideration" behind the "Younger doctrine of non-
intervention" was not the fact that the state criminal process was involved,
but the "comity and federalism" considerations enumerated by Justice
Black in Younger.' o These considerations dictated the applicability of
Younger to Juidice, since there, while the state was not a party, its
contempt process was involved, and its interest in that process was "of
sufficiently great import"'179 to require the application of Younger.'"0
175. See note 170 supra.
176. 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
177. 431 U.S.434(1977).
178. 430 U.S. at 334.
179. Id. at 335.
180. Il. at 337. As in Huffman, it "save[d] for another day the question of 'the
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Justice Stevens, who concurred in the result, explained Younger in
purely remedies terms. As he stated:
The major premise underlying the Court's holding in Younger v. Har-
ris ... is that a court of equity should not act when the moving party
has an adequate remedy at law. Consistently with Younger, a court of
equity may have a duty to act if the alternative legal remedy is
inadequate."'
When this was so, there were no countervailing federalism concerns, since
Mitchum directed the federal courts to act where state proceedings are
"inadequate to vindicate federal rights."'82  And since the challenge was
to the constitutional validity of the state contempt proceedings themselves,
by definition, resort to state court proceedings "cannot provide an ade-
quate remedy for [plaintiffs'] federal claim."" 3 On the merits, however, he
ruled against the plaintiffs.
In my view, Justice Stevens' analysis of the adequacy of state remedies
here is not sound. The concept of "adequate remedy at law" relates only to
whether or not the claim can be asserted as a defense to the pending
proceeding and fairly determined in that proceeding. 8 4 Since the state
court could hold that the contempt proceedings themselves were unconsti-
tutional, the federal plaintiff would suffer no injury by being compelled to
litigate their constitutionality before that court."5 From a remedies
standpoint, the plaintiffs in Juidice clearly had an adequate remedy by
which to assert their constitutional claims in the pending state court
proceeding, and thus suffered no "irreparable injury" which would entitle
them to maintain the "equity" action in the federal court.
In Trainor, Justice White, writing for the Court, found the requisite
state interest, justifying the application of Younger, by virtue of the fact
applicability of Younger to all civil litigation.' " Id. at 336 n.13. Note that in Lynch v.
Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972), the Court held that the challenged garnish-
ment was separable from the pending state court debt collection suit, so that in effect there was
no pending state court proceeding for Younger purposes. See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1972).
181. 430 U.S. at 339 (Stevens, J., concurring).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 340.
184. It was for these reasons respectively that there was no adequate state court remedy
in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), and Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973). See
also Flynt v. Leis, 574 F.2d 874 (6th Cir. 1978).
185. As the plaintiff would suffer, for example, where the proceedings were brought in
bad faith, so that the necessity of defending against them would cause the injury to the right in
question.
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that the state was a party to the proceedings, that the proceedings were
brought to vindicate the integrity of the state's welfare program, and that,
as in Huffman, the state could have brought a criminal proceeding instead
of a civil one.1 6 Justice White also took pains to emphasize that with
respect to the admixture of remedies and federalism considerations,
federalism was the "more vital consideration."'8 7 He illustrated this point
by noting that when federal relief was sought against a pending state court
proceeding, the existence of an adequate "remedy at law," which normally
would be determined by looking to available federal remedies, had to be
"broadened to focus on the remedies available in the pending state
proceeding."' 8 Since the district court had not determined whether the
plaintiffs in the federal action could present their constitituonal challenge
to the attachment statute in the pending state court proceedings, the case
was remanded for a determination of this question. 189
I would submit that the fact that the federal court must look to the
remedies available in the pending state court proceeding is in no way due to
federalism considerations, but results from the dual court system in which
the federal court is in the position of the historical "court of equity" while
the state court is in the position of the historical "court of law." Since the
federal court is being asked to enjoin a pending state court proceeding, the
availability of federal "legal" remedies is completely irrelevant. If the
claim that the attachment statute was unconstitutional could be raised in
the pending state court proceedings, the plaintiff in the federal "equity"
action had an adequate remedy "at law" in the pending state court
proceedings, and the remedies requirement of "irreparable injury" was not
satisfied.
Justice Blackmun, while concurring in the Court's opinion in Trainor,
wrote a separate opinion "only to stress that the substantiality of the State's
interest in its proceeding has been an important factor . . . from the
beginning."' 9 ° In his view, the Court "has imposed a requirement that the
State must show that it has an important interest to vindicate in its own
courts before the federal court must refrain from exercising otherwise
proper federal jurisdiction."' 9' He went on to say that such an interest is
186. 431 U.S. at444.
187. Id. at 441, 443.
188. Id. at 441.
189. Id. at 447.
190. Id. at 448.
191. Id.
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not involved where the federal relief is only against a threatened state
proceeding, as in Steffel, but is involved where the interference would be
with a pending state criminal proceeding or quasi-criminal proceeding, as
in Younger and Huffmnan, or with a state's contempt procedures, as in
Juidice. Largely for the reasons outlined by Justice White, he found that
the state's interest here too was substantial.
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented together in Juidice and
Trainor, again distinguishing between criminal and civil proceedings, and
emphasizing as in Huff'man, the primary responsibility of the federal courts
to protect federal constitutional rights.' 9' Justice Stevens dissented in
Trainor on a number of grounds,'93 and Justice Stewart, who dissented in
Juidice on "Pullman abstention" grounds, 9 4 stated in Trainor that he
agreed with both the Brennan and Stevens dissents.195
As stated previously, in regard to the applicability of Younger to civil
proceedings, the lines on the Court, with the apparent exception of Justice
Stevens, are clearly drawn on the basis of differing conceptions of "Our
Federalism." Insofar as the decisions are based on the articulated federal-
ism considerations, they are inconsistent with my remedies explanation of
Younger and its progeny.
The Court's institutional behavior, however, and the behavior of the
lower federal courts when called upon to deal with this question are not
inconsistent with this explanation. In each of the three cases, a majority of
the Court has found Younger applicable, and the lower federal courts have
either held that Younger applies to all civil proceedings, 96 or to the
particular civil proceeding in question. 97  There has been no reported
unreversed lower court decision holding that Younger was not applicable
to any pending state court proceeding; and unless the Supreme Court
expressly holds that Younger is inapplicable to a particular pending civil
proceeding, it is highly unlikely that a lower federal court will do so
either."' In practice, therefore, Younger has effectively prevented federal
192. Id. at 453-56.
193. Id. at 460-70. Among the grounds was the fact that the statute was"flagrantly and
patently unconstitutional" within the meaning Younger.
194. 430 U.S. at 337-38.
195. 431 U.S. at448.
196. See note 115 supra.
197. See. e.g.. Williams v. Washington. 554 F.2d 369(9thCir. 1977); Anonymous v New
York City Bar Assoc., 515 F.2d 427 (2d Cir.). cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975); Terminal-
Hudson Elec., Inc. v. Department of ConsumerAffairs. 407 F. Stipp. 1075 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
198. For a view as to when Younger should and should not be applicable to pending state
court civil proceedings, see Bartels, supra note 2, at 66-92.
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judicial interference in pending state court proceedings "across the board"
unless the remedies requirement of "irreparable injury" can be satisfied,
and Mitchum has not expanded the role of the federal courts in protecting
federal constitutional rights when proceedings are pending in a state court.
B. The Borderland of Pending and Non-Pending
In three other cases, decided in 1975 and 1977, the Court has sharply
defined the lines of federal intervention so as to make such intervention
depend on the concurrent pendency of federal and state court proceedings.
Where there is concurrent pendency, federal intervention is precluded
unless the Younger criteria are satisfied. Where there is not, federal
intervention is proper regardless of what has occurred in any prior state
court proceeding. The concurrent pendency approach is clearly consistent
with the remedies explanation of Younger that has been advanced in this
article.
In Hicks v. Miranda,'99 decided in 1975, the Court held that where state
criminal proceedings are instituted against the federal plaintiff after the
federal suit was filed, "but before any proceedings of substance on the
merits have taken place in the federal court,"200 Younger is applicable. In
Hicks, the state police had seized a film and charged two employees of the
theater at which it was shown with a violation of the state obscenity law.
The film was also declared obscene and confiscated in a civil proceeding.
The theater owners then filed a federal suit against state officials, seeking a
declaration that the state obscenity law was unconstitutional and an
injunction against its enforcement. While the federal suit was pending, the
state filed criminal charges against the theater owners too. The federal
court refused to dismiss the suit, on the ground that it was filed prior to the
state criminal proceeding and alternatively that the Younger criteria were
satisfied. On the merits, it found that the obscenity law was unconstitu-
tional and enjoined its enforcement.
The Supreme Court reversed. In an opinion by Justice White, it held,
without extended discussion, that (1) the interests of the theater owners
were intertwined with those of their employees, and (2) in any event, once
the theater owners were charged, Younger applied. Justice White noted
that the Court had never held that in order for Younger to apply, "the state
criminal proceedings must be pending on the day the federal case is
199. 422 U.S. 332(1975).
200. Id. at 349.
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filed," 2°  and concluded that to allow the federal suit to proceed after the
state suit was filed, would "trivialize the principles of Younger., 20 2 The
Court also held that the findings of the District Court as to bad faith and
201harassment were "vague and conclusory" and set them aside. Justice
Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Douglas, dissented,
contending that the holding in Hicks "trivialize[d] Steffel," and was an
"open invitation to state officials to institute state proceedings in order to
defeat federal jurisdiction. 2 °4
From a remedies standpoint, however, the holding in Hicks does not
"trivialize Steffel," any more than a contrary holding would have "trivia-
lize[d] Younger." If the Court had held that the subsequent filing of the
criminal proceeding did not "oust the jurisdiction" of the federal "equity"
court, that holding would have been in accord with traditional equity
practice as well as its own prior pronouncements reflecting that practice.' ° 5
On the other hand, under a more realistic definition of adequacy of other
remedies, once a criminal charge was filed against the federal plaintiffs,
they had an "adequate remedy at law," since they could assert the
unconstitutionality of the obscenity statute as a defense in the pending state
court proceedings. The prior filing of the federal suit is thus irrelevant to
the adequacy of other remedies question. In this regard, Hicks is consist-
ent with a remedies explanation of both Younger and Steffel: because a
state court prosecution is now pending, the plaintiff has an adequate
remedy by way of defense to that prosecution and does not need a federal
201. Id.
202. Id. at 350.
203. Id. at 350-52.
204. Id. at 353, 357 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
205. As the Court had long ago noted in In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200,211(1888): The
modern decisions in England, by eminent equity judges, concur in holding that a
court of chancery has no power to restrain criminal proceedings, unless they are
instituted by' a party to a suit already' pending before it, and to try the same right that
is in issue there ....
Id. at 211 (emphasis added).
It reaffirmed this principle in Ex parte Young:
When such indictment or proceeding is brought to enforce an alleged unconstitu-
tional statute, which is the subject matter of inquiry in a suit already pending in a
Federal court, the latter court first having obtained jurisdiction over the subject
matter, has the right, in both civil and criminal cases, to hold and maintain such
jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other courts, until its duty is fully performed.
209 U.S. at 161.
There was no discussion whatsoever of the historical equity practice or of the Court's prior
pronouncements in Justice White's opinion in Hicks. See also the discussion of this point in
Soifer and Macgill. supra note 2, at 1193-95.
[Vol. 9
Summer 1978]
court declaration as to the constitutionality of the law under which the
prosecution is being brought.
20 6
in practice, Hicks necessitates that a Steffel-type action be brought by a
"clean" plaintiff, that is, a plaintiff who has not arguably violated the
challenged law, so that any prosecution for its violation would clearly
constitute "bad faith" under Younger.2 °7 In addition, if the federal
plaintiff can show "irreparable injury" because of the threatened enforce-
ment of the law, the federal court, if it is concerned about preserving its
"jurisdiction," could issue a preliminary injunction against prosecution of
the federal plaintiff.
20 8
Both of these factors were present in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.,2 °9
decided less than a week after Hicks. Three bar owners in the Town of
North Hempstead, New York, were providing topless dancing for the
entertainment of their customers, in response to which the town passed a
"bare breast" ordinance, prohibiting any female from appearing in a public
place with uncovered breasts. The bar owners all covered up their dancers
and shortly thereafter brought a federal suit challenging the constitutional-
ity of the ordinance. One of them, however, uncovered his dancers, and
was immediately charged with a violation of the ordinance. The federal
court subsequently issued a preliminary injunction against the enforcement
of the ordinance.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, unanimously
held that the federal suit could be maintained by the two bar owners who
were not charged under the ordinance, but not by the third bar owner who
was. From a remedies standpoint, the result is clearly correct, and
reinforces the remedies explanation of Hicks. As in Hicks, once the third
bar owner was charged, he had an adequate remedy by way of defense to
the state court prosecution and could challenge the constitutionality of the
ordinance in that proceeding. The two bar owners who covered up were
entitled to at least declaratory relief under Stoeffel, since the activity in
206. Cf Bartels, supra note 2, at 41: "The majority in Hicks therefore decided that in the
balance of federal and state interests, the state's interest in having its criminal processes
proceed unimpeded is stronger than any federalism interest in having earlier-filed federal
actions adjudicated in federal rather than state courts."
207. As to why a prosecution in these circumstances would constitute "bad faith" for
Younger purposes, see the discussion in Sedler, Wake, supra note 3, at 30.
208. The plaintiffs in Hicks had moved for a preliminary injunction after their motion
for a temporary restraining order was denied, but it did not appear that they pursued the
request for preliminary relief strongly.
209. 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
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which they wished to engage, offering topless dancing as entertainment for
their customers, was prohibited by the ordinance.
The state officials argued that since one of the plaintiffs in the federal
suit was barred from obtaining federal relief under Younger, the other two
should be as well. The Second Circuit, on the other hand, took the
position that since two of the plaintiffs were not barred under Younger,
federal relief should be available for the third plaintifftoo. The Supreme
Court disagreed with both positions, and applied Younger to the plaintiff
who had been charged and Steffel to the plaintiffs who had not been
charged. As pointed out above, this result is consistent with a remedies
explanation of both Younger and Steffel.2 '°
In response to the view of the Second Circuit that there should not be
"conflicting outcomes in the litigation of similar issues, 21 ' however,
Justice Rehnquist again invoked federalism considerations, noting that
this interest, "while entitled to substantial deference in a unitary system,
must of necessity be subordinated to the claims of federalism in this
particular area of the law. 212 But how, may it be asked, do the federalism
considerations operate here? Given the federalism values articulated by
Justice Black in Younger and by Justice Rehnquist and Justice White in
Huffinan, Hicks, Juidice, and Trainor, can it not be contended that the
pendency of a case involving the identical ordinance in the state court
21 3
should cause the federal court to "stay its hand?" And given those values,
should this not be so, since as a practical matter, state court officials are not
likely to prosecute following a federal court declaration of unconstitution-
ality, as the federal courts have repeatedly assumed? 21 4 Apparently the
Court did not think so in Salem Inn.
The Court also held that Younger did not apply to the granting of
preliminary injunctive relief and upheld the issuance of the preliminary
injunction. Again, from a remedies standpoint, Younger would necessari-
ly be inapplicable to a claim for preliminary injunctive relief. Since there
was no pending state court proceeding, the only question would be whether
the plaintiff had made out a case of threatened "irreparable injury." which
210. See also the discussion of "personalization" in Fiss, supra note 2. at] 130-33. 1147-
48.
211. 422U.S. at928.
212. Id.
213. The three bar owners were also represented by the same counsel, and obviously
were engaged in a "joint enterprise" in their challenge to the ordinance.
214. See the discussion note 126 supra and accompanying text.
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the plaintiffs presumably could do here, since they could show that the,
were losing business by being unable to provide topless entertainment. 21 5
But again federalism considerations might dictate a contrary result
Assuming that the federal plaintiff has arguably violated the law it
question, which was not so in Salem Inn, the issuance of a preliminar,
injunction, as the Court noted, "seriously impairs the State's interest it
enforcing its criminal laws, and implicates the concerns for federalisn
which lie at the heart of Younger. And if the preliminary injunctiot
were not issued, the state could then prosecute and under Hicks could ous
the federal court of jurisdiction. Despite the Court's admonition t(
district courts to "weigh carefully the interests on both sides, 2 7 its refusa
to extend Younger to the issuance of preliminary injunctive relief, as well a:
its holding that the issuance of the preliminary injunction here was not at
abuse of discretion, makes such injunctions a real possibility in practice.
Salem Inn and Hicks must be read together in terms of explaining th
Court's institutional behavior, and Salem Inn may minimize to a larg(
extent the adverse effect of Hicks for the federal plaintiff. If the federa
plaintiff is "clean" or can persuade the federal district judge to issue
preliminary injunction, Hicks is obviated." 8
The separation between pending and non-pending proceedings wa!
completed in WooleY v. Maynard,2 '9 decided in 1977. The plaintiffs werez
married couple who, as Jehovah's Witnesses, objected on religious ground!
to displaying on their vehicles the New Hampshire license plate containinj
the state motto. "Live Free or Die," and covered up the motto on theil
plates. Mr. Maynard was prosecuted three times in a New Hampshir(
state court for a violation of the state statute prohibiting the obscuring o
license plates. He was convicted each time and on one occasion wa!
sentenced to fifteen days in jail, which he served. The Maynards ther
brought a federal court suit challenging the constitutionality of the statut(
as applied to their actions in covering up the motto and seeking ar
injunction against future prosecutions. The three-judge court found th(
215. Loss of business from the threatened enforcement ofa law was a traditional groum
of"threatened irreparable injury." See note 41 supra.
216. 422U.S. at931.
217. Id.
218. Where the federal plaintiff has arguably violated the law in question, and seeks
preliminary injunction, the 'race to the courthouse" has been replaced by a "race to relief." A
more pessimistic view as to the adverse effect of Hicks is taken in Fiss, supra note 2, at 1134-36
219. 430U.S.705(1977)
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tatute unconstitutional as applied and enjoined further prosecution of the
4aynards.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the state officials argued that Mr.
laynard was precluded by Younger and Huffman from seeking federal
elief because he had failed to seek review of his convictions in the state
ppellate courts, as he could have done, citing Huffman for the proposition
hat "a necessary concomitant of Younger is that a party in [plaintiff's]
,osture must exhaust his state appellate remedies before seeking relief in
he District Court."22  Without dissent on this point,22' the Court,
peaking through Chief Justice Burger, found Huffman inapposite. In
Iuffman, said the Chief Justice, "the [plaintiff] was seeking to prevent, by
neans of federal intervention, enforcement of a state-court judgment
leclaring its theater a nuisance."2 22 The situation here was very different.
ks the Court stated:
Here, however, the suit is in no way'designed to annul the results of a state
trial' since the relief sought is wholly prospective, to preclude further
prosecution under a statute alleged to violate appellees' constitutional
rights. Maynard has already sustained convictions and has served a
sentence of imprisonment for his prior offenses. He does not seek to have
his record expunged, nor to annul any collateral effects those convictions
may have, e.g., upon his driving privileges. The Maynards seek only to be
free from prosecutions for future violations of the same statutes.2
;ince the activity in which the Maynards desired to engage, obscuring the
notto on their license plates, was prohibited by state law, and since Mr.
Aaynard had been prosecuted under that law for engaging in that activity,
rnder Steffel there was an "actual controversy" between the Maynards and
he officials charged with enforcement of the law, thus entitling the
daynards to declaratory relief.224 And since there was a threat of repeated
221)rosecutions coupled with the possibility that the Maynards would be
rohibited from driving because of their violation of the statute, the
equirement of "irreparable injury" was satisfied, thus justifying injunctive
elief as well.
220. Id. at 710 (quoting Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 606).
221. Justice White, joined by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, dissented in part on the
round that the issuance of an injunction against the threatened prosecution was improper.
Id. at 717-19. Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist dissented on the merits. Id. at 719-22.
222. Id. at 710.
223. Id. at711.
224. Id.
225. The threat of repeated prosecutions satisfied the traditional "multiplicity of suits"
,asis of "irreparable injury."
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The holding in Maynard eliminates the confusion caused by Justice
Rehnquist's invocation of the "exhaustion of state remedies" concept in
lluffinan. As pointed out previously, even if the plaintiff in Huffman had
exhausted his state appellate remedies, he would be barred by principles of
res judicata from challenging the validity of the closure order in a
subsequent federal court action."' All that it was necessary for the Court
in Huffman to have said was that since the plaintiff was challenging the
closure order that was still in effect, Younger was applicable, and the
closure order would have to be challenged in the state courts. Mr.
Maynard, however, was not challenging the validity of the past convic-
tions, so there was no pending state court proceeding, and Steffel rather
than Younger applied.
Now, however, let us turn to the question that we left unanswered in our
discussion of Huffman. If, after the closure order had expired, the theater
owner reopened the theater, showing pornographic films, and then brought
a federal action seeking prospective relief against the enforcement of the
Ohio public nuisance law, would the theater owner be barred by res
judicata or collateral estoppel from litigating the question of the la4w's
constitutionality since that question was litigated or could have been
litigated in the prior state court proceeding? Maynard in effect an-
swers this question in the negative. Since the issue of the constitutional-
ity of the application of the New Hampshire statute to Mr. Maynard's
conduct could have been litigated in the prior state court proceedings, he
could have been held to be collaterally estopped from litigating it in the
subsequent federal suit. 227 He was not, and Maynard seems to hold that
insofar as doctrines of resjudicata and collateral estoppel may be operative
in a subsequent federal suit, they only proscribe an attempt to "annul the
results of a state trial., 228 When the federal plaintiff seeks only prospective
relief, as in Maynard and in our Huffman example, it is irrelevant that the
constitutional issue could have been raised in the prior state proceeding,
and presumably irrelevant that it was raised and decided in that proceed-
226. See the discussion notes 163-66 supra and accompanying text. For illustrativc
cases invoking res judicata to bar federal relief with respect to a pending or completed statc
court proceeding, see Piatt v. Louisville & Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 556 F.2d 809 (6th
Cir. 1977); Doe v. Pringle, 550 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1976); Sorger v. Philadelphia Redev. Auth.
401 F. Supp. 348 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Wisnoskiv. Weihing, 396 F. Supp. 1358 (E.D. Wis. 1975)
227. Collateral estoppel involves issue preclusion and unlike res judicata, does no
require identity of parties in the subsequent action.
228. 430 U.S. at 711 (quoting from Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 609).
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ng. It is only the prior state proceeding itself that cannot be "annulled" in
.he subsequent federal proceeding.
-2 9
The federalism considerations, however, that the Court frequently has
nvoked on the side of federal non-interference could dictate the applica-
.ion of res judicata and collateral estoppel to these situations. It could be
;ontended that these principles bar federal relief if the state court either did
)ass or could have passed on the constitutional question inasmuch as for
he federal court to relitigate the same question in a subsequent suit "can
"eadily be interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state court's ability
.o enforce constitutional principles."23 ° Notwithstanding, the Court did
iot so hold in Maynard, and in this regard the applicable principle appears
o be that articulated in Salem Inn to the effect that "[t]he very existence of
)ne system of federal courts and 50 systems of state courts, all charged with
he responsibility for interpreting the United States Constitution, suggests
hat on occasion there will be duplicating and overlapping adjudication of
-ases. . .. 231
More to the point as regards our present analysis, the fact that the state
-ourt proceeding in Maynard had been completed when the federal suit
,vas filed illustrates the application of the concurrent pendency principle.
So long as federal.and state proceedings are not concurrently pending,
Younger is inapplicable. In this sense, Maynard and Hicks are comple-
rientary and support a remedies explanation of Younger and its progeny.
if a state proceeding is pending during the time of the federal suit, the
229. Cf. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). A
3omewhat different explanation is given to Soifer and Macgill, supra note 2, at 1213-15. See
10so the discussion in Fiss, supra note 2, at 1139-43.
230. Huffman. 420 U.S. at 604.
231. 422 U.S. at 928. In Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975). the federal plaintiff had
filed for a divorce in an Iowa state court, which dismissed her suit because she had not satisfied
the state's durational residency requirement. Instead of challenging the constitutionality of
the requirement in that proceeding and pursuing state appellate remedies, she brought the
federal court suit. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the parties were directed to brief the
"Younger issue," and both the plaintiff and the state urged that the Court "reach the merits."
The Court concluded that, "In this posture of the case, and in the absence of a disagreement
between the parties, we have no occasion to consider whether any consequences adverse to
appellant [plaintiff] resulted from her first obtaining an adjudication of her claim on the merits
in the Iowa state court and only then commencing this action in the United States District
Court." Id. at 396 n.3. Since the plaintiff could only get one divorce in Iowa, Sosna seems
more like Huffman than like Maynard, and the federal plaintiff would be seeking to "annul"
Lhe prior state proceeding in the subsequent federal proceeding. But since Younger does not
go to thejurisdiction of the federal court - when the plaintiff's claim is founded on 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, federal jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) - the defense to federal
intervention provided by Younger can be waived, as it was here.
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federal plaintiff, in the absence of a showing of "irreparable injury," has at
adequate remedy by way of defense to the pending state court proceeding il
which to assert the federal constitutional claim, and it is of no import tha
the federal suit was filed first. Conversely, if no state court proceeding i:
pending at the same time as the federal proceeding is pending, the federa
plaintiff by definition can have no adequate remedy by way of defense to
non-existent proceeding, and it is likewise of no import that such a remedl
may have existed at an earlier time. The concurrent pendency principh
was also involved in Salem Inn, where the party against whom a statc
proceeding was pending could not maintain the federal suit, but thos(
against whom no state proceeding was pending could maintain the suit. I
is the concurrent pendency principle, illustrated in Hicks, Salem Inn, an(
MaYnardthat furnishes the strongest support for a remedies explanation o
Younger and its progeny.
VI. EQUITY, COMITY FEDERALISM:
A RETROSPECTIVE VIEW
It has been the thesis of this article that while Younger and its progen3
have seen the Court articulate an admixture of remedies and federalisrr
considerations as the basis for its decisions, and while as between the two
federalism has been the "more vital consideration," the results of these
decisions can best be explained in remedies terms and are in accord witl
traditional remedies principles relating to judicial interference with govern-
mental action.
The results in remedies terms may be summarized as follows. Wherea
state court proceeding is pending concurrently with the federal proceeding
irrespective of which proceeding was filed first, the plaintiff in the federa:
"equity" action has an "adequate remedy at law" by way of defense to the
pending state court proceeding, and is not entitled to affirmative relief23'
unless it can be shown that this remedy is not adequate to protect the right,
in question.233 Where no state court proceeding is pending concurrently
with the federal proceeding, even though there may have been a prior statc
court proceeding, by definition there is no "adequate remedy at law," and
232. SeeTrainorv. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434(1977);Juidicev. Vail,430 U.S. 327(1977)
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975)
Youngerv. Harris, 401 U.S. 37(1971).
233. See Gersteinv. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103(1975); Gibsonv. Berryhill,411 U.S.564(1973)
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the plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief or injunctive relief if an "actual
zontroversy" or threatened "irreparable injury" is shown."'
It is only in the area of relief against pending state court civil proceed-
ings that the doctrine enunciated by the Court is necessarily inconsistent
with this remedies explanation. From a remedies standpoint, federal relief
should not be available against any pending state court civil proceeding
unless "irreparable injury" is shown, and from a remedies standpoint, there
is no basis for distinguishing between pending criminal and pending civil
proceedings. In this area the doctrine that the Court has articulated is
based entirely on federalism considerations. In practice, however, the
Court has invariably held that Younger applied to the particular civil
proceeding before it, and the lower federal courts likewise have held that
Younger either applies to all civil proceedings or to the civil proceeding in
question. While the doctrine, therefore, is not consistent with a remedies
explanation of Younger and its progeny, the practice of the courts is.
Insofar as the results in these cases are explained in remedies terms, they
also indicate that, despite the general view to the contrary,235 Younger and
its progeny have not been a significant element of the present Court's
ongoing process of restricting access to the federal courts to protect federal
constitutional rights.236  As Steffel, Salem Inn and Maynard make clear,
the Court has not invoked "Our Federalism" to bar federal relief against
state governmental action, so long as concurrent state court proceedings
are not pending against the federal plaintiff. And Mitchum authorizes
federal relief against a pending state court proceeding whenever the
remedies requirement of "irreparable injury" is satisfied.
But, it may be asked, what about Younger and the restrictions on
federal relief against pending state court proceedings that implicate federal
constitutional rights? As stated previously, Younger, like Dombrowski,
was about the first amendment, not about federal judicial protection of
federal constitutional rights.237  Younger removed the "void on its face"
aspect of Dombrowski and thereby significantly weakened the protection
that the Court had afforded to first amendment rights. A similar weaken-
234. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S.
?22 (1975); Steffel v. Thomspon, 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
235. See, e.g., the discussion in Neuborne, The Procedural Assault on the Warren
Legacy: A Study in Repeal by Indirection, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 545, 556-68 (1977).
236. See generally SOCIETY OF AMERICAN LAW TEACHERS. SUPREME COURT DENIAL OF
CITIZEN ACCESS TO THE FEDERAL COURTS TO CHALLENGE UNCONSTITUTIONAL OR OTHER
UNLAWFUL ACTION: THE RECORD OF THE BURGER COURT (1976).
237. See the discussion note 92 supra and accompanying text.
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ing of the protection afforded to first amendment rights, both substantivel.
and remedially, however, was occurring in other cases, including thos
involving challenges to federal governmental action,238 reflecting, in m:
view, the Court's value judgment to limit the scope of the dissent and socia
change function of the first amendment.2 39 But Younger did not deal witl
the matter of access to the federal courts generally, nor with federaljudicia
interference with state governmental action beyond the first amendmen
context, and the invocation of federalism considerations in Younge
merely may have served to mask the value judgment that the Court wa
making about the dissent and social change function of the first amend
ment.
Once Younger is put into its first amendment context, it is clear that th
other non-intervention decisions of the Younger progeny - Huffman
Hicks, Juidice and Trainor - do not represent a diminution of access ti
the federal courts to protect federal constitutional rights because no suc
access existed previously. Huffman and Hicks involved first amendmen
claims, and once "void on its face" was no longer equated with "irreparabl
injury" to first amendment rights, there was no basis for federal "equity
intervention since the federal plaintiff now had an "adequate remedy a
law" for the assertion of first amendment claims by way of defense to th
pending state court proceeding. Juidice and Trainor involved claims tha
other federal rights were being violated in pending state court proceedings
and even in the heyday of Dombrowski, the Supreme Court had neve
authorized federal interference in pending state court proceedings ti
240
protect non-first amendment rights. What Younger took away then wa
the expanded protection to first amendment rights that had been given ii
Dpmbrowski, and Younger and its progeny imposed no new restrictions ol
access to federal courts to protect federal constitutional rights. Th,
limitations on access that exist under Younger and its progeny are th
result of the application of traditional remedies principles to judicial relie
against governmental action and are fully consistent with the Court's prio
practice in this area.
The real federalism significance of Younger and its progeny then is no
that the Court has invoked federalism considerations to restrict the federa
judicial protection that would be afforded against state governmenta
238. See the discussion notes 93-100 supra and accompanying text.
239. As to the dissent and social change function of the first amendment, see th
discussion in Sedler, Book Review, 80 YALE L. J. 1070, 1079-80 (1971).
240. See the discussion notes 113-44 supra and accompanying text.
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action under traditional remedies principles, but that it has not seen "Our
Federalism" as imposing the qffirmative responsibility on the federal courts
o protect federal constitutional rights from state governmental action
without regard to traditional remedies principles. This affirmative respon-
3ibility would seem to follow from the emanations of Mitchum, as the
Jissenters so cogently argued in Huffman241 and subsequent cases.242 The
-rucial federalism question, it is submitted, is whether federaljudicial relief
should be granted against pending state court proceedings in order to
protect federal constitutional rights, not because there is not a legally
adequate remedy by which those rights can be protected in the state court
proceedings,2 43 but because the federal courts, which as a result of 42
J.S.C. § 1983 have been "interpose[d] . . .between the States and the
)eople, as guardians of the people's federal rights [and] to protect the
)eople from unconstitutional action under color of state law, 'whether that
Lction be executive, legislative or judicial.' ,244 have the affirmative
'esponsibility to protect those rights notwithstanding the pendency of a
;tate court proceeding.
The reasons why the federalism considerations articulated by the Court
in Mitchum mandate that the federal courts should have this affirmative
responsibility, have been fully developed by Justices Brennan and Marshall
in245 246in dissent, ' and by other commentators, and there is no reason to
elaborate on them here. Unlike Justices Brennan and Marshall, however,
I would not distinguish between pending civil and pending criminal
proceedings. In both instances the role of the federal courts "to protect the
people from unconstitutional action under color of state law, 247 is the
same. With the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Congress gave the federal
-ourts the primary responsibility for the protection of federal constitution-
al rights, and it should not abdicate that responsibility merely because the
241. 420 U.S. at 613-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
242. See note 192 supra.
243. 1 continue to believe, however, as Professor Amsterdam has pointed out, that
'federal judges are more enlightened concerning, more tolerant toward, and more courageous
.o protect, federal rights than are their state counterparts." Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecu-
'ions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus
lurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 793, 837 n.186 (1965). On the
-natter of federal and state court judges, see also Neuborne, The Myth of ParitY. 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1105(1977).
244. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,242 (1972).
245. See notes 192 and 241 supra.
246. See generally the works cited in note 2 supra and Neuborne. supra note 243.
247. 407 U.S. at 242.
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federal plaintiff has an "adequate remedy at law" in a pending state court
proceeding. As Justice Brennan stated in his dissent in Juidice:
In requiring the District Court to eject the federal plaintiff from the
federal courthouse and to force him to seek vindication of his federal
rights in pending state proceedings, the Court effectively cripples the
congressional scheme enacted in § 1983. The crystal clarity of the
congressional decision and purpose in adopting § 1983, and the unbroken
line of this Court's cases enforcing that decision, expose Huffman and
today's decision as deliberate and conscious floutings of a decision
Congress was constitutionally empowered to make. It stands that § 1983
remedy on its head to deny the § 1983 plaintiff access to the federal forum
because of the pendency of state civil proceedings where Congress
intended that the district court: should entertain his suit without regard to
the pendency of the state suit. Rather than furthering principles of
comity and our federalism, forced federal abdication in this context
undercuts one of the chief values of federalism - the protection and
vindication of important and overriding federal civil rights, which
Congress, in § 1983 and the Judiciary Act of 1875, ordained should be a
primary responsibility of the federal courts.2
4 s
It is these federalism considerations that properly should prevail over any
remedies considerations that would support the denial of federal relief
when a proceeding is pending concurrently in the state courts.
Nor will the availability of federal relief against pending state court
proceedings produce any real collision between federal and state courts or
interfere with the effective operation of the state courts. In practice, state
courts and state officials generally do recognize that the federal courts have
the primary responsibility to protect federal constitutional rights and to
interpret the federal constitution. 24' As was demonstrated in the "Dom-
browski years," when a federal court issues a declaratory judgment that a
state law is unconstitutional, it is highly unlikely that state officials will
prosecute under it,250 a point that the Supreme Court itself expressly
recognized in Roe v. Wade.25' And even if injunctive relief should be
248. 430 u.s. at 343-44. It is submitted that the congressional intent referred to is no
different depending on the criminal or non-criminal nature of the state proceeding.
249. Nor are the state court judges, most of whom are popularly elected, and state
officials adverse to having the federal court "take them off the hook" by ruling on the
constitutionality of state laws. While federal interference "can readily be interpreted 'as
reflecting negatively upon the state court's ability to enforce constitutional principles.' "
Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604, it may be queried whether state court judges would really mind that
"negative reflection."
250. See note 54 supra.
25 1. See the discussion, note 126 supra and accompanying text.
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necessary, it can be granted against the state officials or the civil litigants,
and ordinarily the state judiciary will not be involved.252 Federaljudicial
interference with the state judicial system thus can be kept to a minimum.
This point is illustrated by both Juidice and Trainor where the federal
court's determination of the plaintiffs' constitutional claims would not
affect the continuation of the pending state court proceedings since the
challenge was only to the validity of subsidiary contempt and attachment
procedures, not to the underlying state law claim, and their invalidation by
the federal court would not affect the substance of the state court proceed-
ing:
The only time that the federal courts should not interfere in a pending
state court proceeding is where the federal claim arises during the pendency
of a state court trial, and federal court resolution of that claim would delay
the trial of the case. As the Court noted in Dombrowski, "[iut is difficult to
think of a case in which an accused could properly bring a state prosecution
to a halt while a federal court decides his claim that certain evidence is
rendered inadmissible by the Fourteenth Amendment." '53  But if such a
claim were raised prior to trial, such as in a suit to enjoin state officials from
254using the evidence , there is no reason why a federal court should not
determine the constitutional question and if it finds the evidence to have
been illegally seized, enjoin its use in any subsequent trial."' So long as
resolution of the federal claim would not disrupt the trial of a pending state
court case, there should be "due respect to a suitor's choice of a federal
forum for the hearing and decision of his federal constitutional claims," '256
and the federal court should entertain the suit.2 57  By so doing, it will be
252. In criminal cases, as a practical matter, the federal suit is likely to be brought shortly
after the initiation of the state court proceeding, and it is very probable that the state
proceeding will be held in abeyance pending the federal court's determination of the
constitutional question.
253. 380 U.S. at 485 n.3.
254. See, e.g., Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951), where the federal suit was
brought after the plaintiff had been indicted by the state grand jury, but prior to the trial of the
case.
255. As applied to claims of illegal search and seizure, this approach would enable the
federal courts to determine the claim, which they are now precluded from doing in a habeas
corpus proceeding brought after conviction. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
256. Zwicklerv. Koota, 389 U.S. 241,248(1967).
257. Of course, where the claim was first raised and litigated in the pending state court
proceeding, res judicata would prevent its relitigation in an independent federal court
proceeding. See note 226 supra. A party is entitled to a choice of a federal forum in which to
litigate that party's federal constitutional claim, but is not entitled to litigate the claim in both
the state and federal courts.
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performing the function that Congress entrusted to the federal courts by
the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and it will be performing this function
without in any real way interfering with the ability of the state courts to
carry out their own operations.' 58 This, it is submitted, is the unrealized
promise of Mitchum.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article I have attempted to demonstrate that while Younger, and
its progeny have articulated an admixture of remedies and federalism
considerations, with the latter being "more vital," the results in these cases
indicate that the Court has generally applied traditional remedies princi-
ples to determine the scope of federal judicial interference with the exercise
of state governmental power. If a state proceeding is pending during the
time of a federal suit, the federal plaintiff, in the absence of a showing of
"irreparable injury," has an adequate remedy by way of defense to the
pending state court proceeding in which to assert the federal constitutional
claim.259 But if there is no concurrent pendency of federal and state court
proceedings, by definition the plaintiff cannot have an adequate remedy in
a non-existent state court proceeding and is entitled to federal declaratory
or injunctive relief if an "actual controversy" or threatened "irreparable
injury" is shown.
When so viewed, Younger and its progeny have not been a significant
factor in the present Court's ongoing process of restricting access to the
federal courts to protect federal constitutional rights. Considerations of
"Our Federalism" have not prevented federal protection where remedies
considerations justify relief against state governmental action. The real
problem, it is submitted, is that the Court has not seen "Our Federalism" as
imposing the affirmative responsibility on the federal courts to protect
federal constitutional rights from state governmental action without
258. Typical of such a case is Diaz v. Stathis, 576 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1978), where two
defendants in a pending state criminal proceeding and a plaintiff in a pending state civil
proceeding brought a federal suit to challenge the exclusion of persons with Hispanic
surnames from the jury rolls. The court held that the suit of the defendants in the criminal
proceeding was barred by Younger, but that the plaintiff in the state civil proceeding might be
able to obtain declaratory relief. It found, however, that the civil plaintiff had not met the
burden of showing the necessity for federal intervention. Adjudication of the question ofjury
exclusion by the federal court would in no way interfere with either the pending criminal or
civil proceeding.
259. Although the Court has not in terms of doctrine applied this principle to all pending
state court civil proceedings, this has been the result in practice. See the discussion, notes
196-98 supra and accompanying text.
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regard to traditional remedies principles. As it now stands, it is the law of
remedies that determines the scope of federal judicial interference with the
unconstitutional exercise of state governmental power. That this is so
indicates that something is amiss in "Our Federalism"
